i879-J 
The Course of Nature. 
77 
uniformity and supremacy of the laws of nature. But when 
thinkers of the other school maintain the doCtrine, and trace 
it to its logical consequences, undisguised by sentimental 
language or figure of speech, they are met with criticism 
which I can account for only by supposing that the theolo- 
gian understands by laws of nature something different from 
what is understood by the man of science. 
Let us try to condense the questions at issue into the 
smallest possible space. The scientific philosopher main- 
tains that the natural course of events goes on in invariable 
accordance with certain knowable laws. He asks the 
theologian in the words of Pope : — 
“ T'nink’st thou like some weak Prince the eternal cause 
Prone for his favourites to reverse his laws ? 
Shall burning ^Etna, if a sage requires, 
Forget to thunder and recall her fires ? 
On air or sea new motions be impress’d, 
O blameless Bethel, to relieve thy breast ? 
When the loose mountain trembles from on high 
Shall gravitation cease if you go by ? 
Or some old temple, nodding to its fall, 
For Chartres’ head reserve the hanging wall ?” 
To all these questions the other answers no, and thus all 
occasion for dispute ought to end. But it does not end, by 
any means ; for he proceeds to criticise the views of the 
questioner on the ground of their narrowness, and to inform 
him that the Creator can (and, by implication, that he does) 
so arrange things that any result he may wish shall be 
brought about by the aCtion of natural laws themselves. 
“We do not expeCt TEtna to recall her fires when a sage is 
near ; or the air and ocean to acquire new motions to pre- 
serve a saint from danger.” . . . “ Should these individuals 
not be rushing recklessly against the known laws of Heaven, 
or should it be the will of God to preserve them, it will be 
found that provision has been made for their escape, and 
that not through the powers of nature disobeying their own 
laws, but through other powers in nature opportunely inter- 
posing to stop, to turn aside, or otherwise to modify their 
operation.” 
Now, always supposing that such remarks as these are 
intended to apply to the domain of sight, hearing, and under- 
standing, they differ fundamentally from the scientific theory 
in their view of what constitutes the laws of nature. The 
school seems to look upon causes and effects in nature as 
belonging to two different classes of things. They see an 
immense collection of causes, to each of which the appro- 
priate effeCt is tied. So long as the cause is followed by its 
