446 Natural Science and Morality. Cj u ly> 
happiness, his action should be determined not by the dogma 
that, “between his own happiness and that of others, 
Utilitarianism requires him to be as striftly impartial as a 
disinterested speftator,’’* but because he clearly perceives 
that if all agree to aft similarly, all, including therefore 
himself, will be benefited. To-day A relinquishes a small 
pleasure, and B gains a great one : to-morrow B may do the 
same for C, C for D, and so on, until ultimately Z may 
sacrifice his own immediate smaller happiness for the greater 
happiness of A. Seeing, then, that by the praftice of 
unselfishness each individual in our mutual-benefit society 
has succeeded in exchanging a smaller pleasure for a larger 
one, it seems but natural to describe unselfishness as self- 
interest, and it appears to be only by a most unfortunate 
oversight that the late John Stuart Mill persisted in repudi- 
ating the idea that it was desirable for individuals to aft 
each for his own interest. f 
But if selfishness is the opposite of self-interest, by the 
praftice of which civilised man would quickly reduce himself 
to the condition of brute beasts, it becomes easy for the 
naturalist to conclude that man may have evolved himself 
from some lower form simply by virtue of improvement in 
power to deteft his own self-interest. Dimly perceiving the 
advantages of association, mankind has in this view gra- 
dually drifted by the rude method of trial and error into 
codes of written and unwritten laws, which, less or more 
efficiently, make selfishness immediately disadvantageous to 
the individual who practises it, so that the simple guide of 
aftion for each and all may be self-interest. Thus, to take 
a simple case for mere sake of illustration : if an intelligent 
man, influenced solely by the desire to obtain certain goods 
* Utilitarianism, 1863, pp. 24, 25. 
f “ I must again repeat what assailants of Utilitarianism seldom have the 
justice to acknowledge, that the happiness which forms the Utilitarian standard 
of what is right is not the agent’s own happiness, but that of all concerned.” — 
Mill, Utilitarianism , 1863, p. 24. The important word “ but ” is italicised by 
ourselves : it implies the incompatibility of two interests which, as. we contend, 
a&ually coincide. Mill also remarks that there is “ happiness in absolutely 
sacrificing one’s own happiness to the happiness of the greatest number.” — 
(Pp. 24, 25.) This apparent contradiction, or seemingly irreconcilable state- 
ment, can be due to nothing else than the failure to realise that the happiness 
or interest of the individual need not be incompatible with that of the greatest 
number ; but that it may be to the interest of the individual to forego certain 
benefits for the sake of gaining the esteem and friendship of his fellows, the 
reward of whose esteem would more than compensate the privation undergone, 
so that no absolute “ sacrifice ” of happiness would occur. Indeed, no doubt 
one of the prificipal rewards of the labours of unselfish people is to be found 
in the inestimable prize of the real and cordial friendship of their neighbours 
and companions. 
