l 88 o.] Natural Science and Morality . 455 
in order to gain the inestimable benefits of co-operation and 
friendship among mankind. 
Mr. Darwin, in his work “The Descent of Man,” appears 
to consider that man (in relation to the principle of Evolu- 
tion) may be still influenced to a certain extent by some of 
the more important “ instincts ” which formerly belonged 
to a lower state, such as “ Sociability ” for instance. But it 
would not seem to follow necessarily from this (and perhaps 
this would not be essentially implied) that man might not 
now, by the light of his reason, test these instincts, in order 
to see whether they are desirable or not. At least it may 
probably be conceded that it would not be a thing to be 
wished that man should be dominated by “ instinct ” with- 
out the control of reason, or this would surely be a some- 
what low (and undefined) basis on which to rest morality. 
It becomes only necessary, therefore, to trace an “ instinft” 
[shown to be dependent on Natural Selection] up to its 
rational basis, in order to see that this is self-interest. This 
amounts to no more than taking the final step of advancing 
the undefined “ instinct ” up to its definition. We must not 
shrink from this through fear of discovering the bogey 
Selfishness behind it. The worst of this confounding of 
self-interest with selfishness is that it has caused inquirers 
to fear reason. It would be a pitiful state of things if we 
were afraid to look Reason in the face. Morality thus loses 
all its dignity. While a lower animal may aft by such and 
such an “ instinft ” (“sociability” for instance) without 
being able to appreciate the cause of the “instinft,” man, 
on the other hand, may be able to define the reasons for it, 
and even to say beforehand whether a given course of aftion 
is desirable or not. 
There cannot, we think, be a shadow of a doubt, on ana- 
lysing the question impartially, that the extraordinary faft 
of no generally recognised standard of conduft existing — in 
spite of the immense advance of the other sciences — is 
mainly due to the mistaking of self-interest for selfishness 
(its opposite). For it is a notorious faft that the self-interest 
morality has been driven home by hard logic again and 
again, by the ablest minds from the Greeks downwards, but 
its fitness or suitability has escaped appreciation, or the 
bugbear of Selfishness has always intruded itself and pre- 
vented its adoption. Nevertheless, it may be observed that 
the only escape from selfishness is by recourse to the morality 
of self-interest. If a man by praftising unselfishness earns 
the immense benefit of the high esteem and friendship of 
his neighbours, is he to forego this benefit and become 
