1880 .} Natural Science and Morality . 457 
will it surely become that the negledl to identify morality 
with self-interest has caused great evils. It has afted as 
the strongest discouragement to virtue, by making it appear 
against one’s interests, and has given rise to the invention 
of those pernicious dogmas (above referred to) which are 
worse than vain attempts at terrorism. If in the general 
system of education it were invariably taught that the path 
of virtue, or strict honesty and sobriety, was absolutely in 
acccordance with self-interest (in fadt that virtue is its own 
reward), and that such practices as intemperance, thieving, or 
deceit were to be avoided, because they were against one s 
interests , — instead of the absurd statement that they are 
“ wicked ” (which only makes them more attractive, from 
the intangible nature of the reason), there can be no ques- 
tion that immense good would result. In fadt it would be 
doing more than making morality stand upon reason, its 
only sure basis. 
Responsibility and Physical Causation . 
It has been argued by some that from the fadt of the 
original formation of man’s character having been deter- 
mined by causes beyond his control (or because a person is 
not reponsible for his inherited brain structure), that there- 
fore he cannot be made accountable for his actions. Mill 
notices this view in his “Utilitarianism, p. 83, viz. : The 
Owenite invokes the admitted principle that it is unjust to 
punish anyone for what he cannot help. But we think it 
may be made clear that the supposed absence of respon- 
sibility under the above conditions is a fallacy, and that in 
addition to this, the doCtrine of strict causal sequence in 
nature may enable us to arrive at what might be capable of 
forming a rough basis for a scientific penal code. We will 
endeavour to point this out in as clear terms as possible. 
When any crime is contemplated, the eventuality of 
punishment is taken into consideration beforehand, and 
balanced against the direCt material gain that would ensue 
from the crime, the chances of escape being duly allowed lor, 
and it is this balancing process that accompanies the deci- 
sion of the wrong doer to commit the offence. The addi- 
tional punishment, consisting in forfeiture of position in 
society (which would probably be of itself more than sum- 
cient to deter any respedtable member) does not of course 
influence the habitual criminal. If therefore the punishment 
fixed beforehand by society (*.«., by the penal code) be such 
that when the criminal has duly allowed for the chances of 
