534 Correspondence. [August, 
conclusion) that the brain might be a mechanism competent to 
regulate all* the motions of the corporeal system (for a set of 
dynamical conditions adapted to any effedt is conceivable). In 
view of this, does not the assumption of this mysterious 
“ deflecting power ” seem all the more unwarrantable, or even 
absurd ; as if it were imagined that the brain, being already 
there to diredt the corporeal movements, something additional 
were necessary to diredt the brain, or as if it were supposed that 
[the brain being the seat of the identity] something besides the 
identity were required to diredt the adtions of the body ? This 
would seem to be no more than a specimen of the kind of incon- 
gruities which may be expedted to present themselves by any 
attempt to evade physical principles. 
It could not, however, be said that the opposite party were 
entirely free from error. For there appears to have been a 
notable oversight on the side of those who uphold stridt Causal 
Sequence in Nature (sometimes called “ Necessity ”) in failing 
to appreciate adequately the important influence (on the question 
of Free Will) of the fadt that the brain is the seat of individu- 
ality, as above insisted on. For the omission to give due import 
to this fadt has naturally made stridl Causal Sequence to appear 
as a sort of grinding process, whereby man’s adtions are deter- 
mined independently of his individuality ; a view which is no 
doubt repulsive, and may have served as some excuse for the 
invention of the curious device of defledting particles by the 
“ mind ” or “ will.” It will be observed, however, that by simply 
substituting the word “ brain ” (which includes “ mind ”) for the 
word u mind ” in the foregoing sentence, a defledtion of particles 
of matter (represented by the diredtion of material operations 
by the brain) then can take place in accordance with, and not in 
opposition to, the laws of Nature. For from the very fadl of 
the brain substance forming part of the material universe, it 
must of course influence and diredt material operations in con- 
formity with natural causes. 
Could it be justly said that there is any compulsion in this ? 
Can there be compulsion in being obliged to adt in accordance 
with one’s individuality or identity (determined by brain struc- 
ture), since the only conceivable escape from this would be to 
adt in opposition to one’s identity (scarcely a desirable end) ? 
But, it may be argued, there is still some coercion left here, 
* Does it not seem a violation of principle, or a kind of inconsistency, to 
recognise that the brain does, in fa<5t, diredt certain motions of the corporeal 
system (and even those of a complex charadter, such as the digestion of the 
food, the circulation, &c.)> and yet to assume that the brain would be incom- 
petent to diredt a// the motions of the body ? It may be said that a reasoning 
process accompanies the diredtion of some of these motions, but not others. 
But then is not reasoning itself a brain process, or is it not universally admitted 
that the reasoning faculty (whatever its exadt nature) is at least connected with 
the brain, or has a physical side, just as, indeed, the mental faculties generally 
(or “ mind ”) could not exist without brain ? 
