i$ 8 o.] Correspondence. 535 
because, although brain structure may be the seat of individuality 
or “ mind,” nevertheless, since our brains were originally formed 
by the operation of causes beyond our control, there is coercion 
in this aspedl of the case. But then do even the most ardent 
supporters of Free Will ever dream of upholding the expectation 
that an individual should have a control in the original formation 
of his brain ? or do they not concede (and rightly) that the ideal 
of Free Will is that an individual should act in strict accordance 
with (and not in opposition to) his own identity ? Yet this is 
precisely what the believer in strict Causal Sequence, who has a 
just appreciation of the functions of the brain, will maintain 
must necessarily occur. Solely in virtue of the fact that there 
is strict Causal Sequence in Nature are the actions brought into 
strict conformity with individual brain structures (or with iden- 
tity). If the principles of dynamics were not rigid, or if the 
laws of Nature were liable to alteration, a man’s actions might 
sometimes be in harmony with his brain structure, sometimes in 
discord with it ; or any number of persons, though possessing 
totally different brain structures, might act identically. The 
questionable expediency of the proceeding of those who are dis- 
posed to grumble at what they term the “ iron ” laws of Nature 
becomes apparent here. 
But is it not, after all, more satisfactory to look to a definite 
physical basis for identity or individuality, as dependent on the 
magnificent mechanism of the brain, in preference to the super- 
ficial view of ignoring all this ? No doubt there have been mis- 
understandings on both sides of this Free Will v. Necessity 
question,— the Free Will party, failing to appreciate justly the 
sequence of cause and effecft ; the Necessitarians, on the other 
hand, omitting to realise fully the important bearing of the rela- 
tion of individuality to brain-strudture on this question. No 
logical ground could be given why a complete agreement should 
not be possible on this subject ; for there can evidently be but 
one correct view on any subject or question whatever. Moreover, 
from the very fad\ of the fundamental character of this question, 
it would follow necessarily that the wrong view on this subject 
must involve a great error, which therefore could hardly escape 
detection under a careful analysis. The divergence of views 
here is, however, no doubt more apparent than real ; for if Free 
Will may be justly regarded as the freedom to acT in accordance 
with identity (or as the assertion of individuality), then such 
freedom of will actually exists, and, moreover, the very condition 
for its existence is seen to be the prevalence of that strict Causal 
Sequence in Nature demanded by the Necessitarians. Thus the 
two views would show themselves capable of reconciliation on a 
common basis. That this fa<5t should have apparently hitherto 
escaped appreciation may possibly be to some extent due to that 
spirit of partisanship which has so largely entered into this 
question, whereby the judgment may be allowed to be uncon- 
