792 
Correspondence. 
[December, 
certain natural processes are unsatisfactory, he reproduces the 
sneering hope that this philosopher may have due warning “ if 
plans for a new universe are required.” I would, therefore, ask 
if a writer who goes so far is greatly wronged if he is said to 
uphold the perfection of Nature ? ” If I accuse B C of having 
stolen £100, has he any right to feel indignant if, on minute 
search, it appears that the sum pilfered was only £gg 15s. ? 
He further writes : — “ Nowhere do I assert that beauty is 
substantially universal.” Yet on p. 59 he tells us that “ natural 
objects are for the most part beautiful.” Here again his own 
words fully bear out my construction. He denies having pro- 
nounced beauty as existing for man alone, but for its own sake — 
whatever that may mean. Yet on p. 59 we find him exclaiming 
against some who would have us believe that these things were 
in no wise made for beauty nor for the delight of man. The 
question implicitly put in my article (“Journal of Science,” p. 570 ), 
for whom and for what ugly or loathsome things were made, he over- 
looks. If God has created beauty for his own delectation — which 
is, perhaps, the only rational interpretation to be put on the asser- 
tion that beauty exists “for its own sake” — “why,” as Mr. 
Baildon asks (p. 61) “ should the external aspect of an animal be 
so much more seemly than its internal ? Are not both equally 
visible to God ? 
The attempt to deny or to explain away pain is so palpable in 
Mr. Baildon’s seventh chapter that any attempt to prove it is 
utterly needless. I am aware that he professes a wish to “ con- 
fine the inquiry to sub-human nature,” but, as I pointed out in 
“ A Change of Front,” he loses sight of this limitation in the 
words : — “ The impartial thoughtfulness of Nature puzzles us. 
We are offended to find the existence of a parasite cared for as 
tenderly as man.” He says further, “ unless our bodies were of 
invulnerable materials pain is indispensable,” and he pronounces 
p a i n — if rightly or wrongly is not here the question — “ an im- 
portant factor in the evolution of human virtue.” 
He is particularly dissatisfied at the words, “ the purposes of 
God are assumed as fully known and understood.” Now in the 
“ Spirit of Nature,” p. 215, we read, “ Nature is at once the Pro- 
tagonist and Antagonist of man, at once his Alma Mater , his 
kindly mother, and the strong angel against whom he must for 
ever wrestle.” Is not here the assumption of a knowledge of the 
Divine purposes, especially if we remember that one of the senses 
in which the word “ Nature ” is used (p. 95) is as a more reve- 
rent synonym for God. 
The distinction between Mr. Baildon’s “ design and contri- 
vance ” and that of Paley is mainly that the latter goes more 
into detail. On p. 73 we find, however, a section which is 
thoroughly Paleyan. 
Thus I submit that the representation which I have given of 
the author’s views is essentially correct. Perhaps the offence 
