i88ij 
Life and its Basis. 
n 
does it properly belong ? What is the being which exerts 
it ? As it cannot be matter, which is, per se, inert, it must be 
some adtive principle. And here we enter upon the domain 
of psychology. Such a principle has been actually recognised 
in all ages ; it was called by the Hebrews ‘ nephesh,’ by the 
Greeks ‘psyche,’ by the Latins 4 anima ,’ and perhaps our 
English word ‘soul’ (though doubtless used also in other 
senses) comes nearest to it. The Latin word * anima ’ is, I 
think, the most appropriate, on account of its being the root 
of animal , animate, and their derivatives, besides its allowing 
the easier use of the plural noun. I therefore ask my 
readers’ permission to employ it here in preference to 
‘ psyche.’ 
As to the ultimate nature of this 4 anima,’ all we can do 
is to compare it to our own thinking entity ; with respedt to 
which we have most important additional evidence, viz., an 
intuitive and all but irresistible convidtion that it is some- 
thing of a very different nature from the body, and non- 
material. Moreover, it is as really a separate being as 
the body which it animates ; and in whatever sense the 
body has a unity, the 4 anima ’ must also be called one. As 
we descend in the scale of organisms, we meet with an 
arrangement which appears to indicate a kind of corporate 
life, which some have likened to a republic of human beings. 
Is it not possible, however, that in such cases the 4 anima ’ may 
be single, seeing that in the higher animals the 4 anima,’ 
though single, extends through and adls upon a multitude 
of different, though associated organs ? 
Let us next enquire into the duration of these 4 animse.’ In 
this matter we must invert the order of time, and consi- 
der its termination first. Is what we call the death of an 
animal the end also of the existence of its 4 anima ?’ In the 
total absence of even a probability of their existence subse- 
quent to the cessation of vital adtion, and the disintegration 
of their bodily^ frames, we are clearly justified in asserting that 
the 4 anima ’ then ceases to exist ; that its existence is more or 
less a transient one. No reason can be given why such 
transient entities should not be created, for the length of 
their existence must be simply dependent on the power 
which calls them into being. 
The 4 anima,’ then, in living animals is an entity endowed 
with will, though human observation may not, in every case, 
be able to detedt its working. 
We may now advert to the important but very obscure 
question of its origin. Is the existence of the non-material 
4 anima ’ coeval and coincident with the formation of the 
VOL. III. (third series). g 
