76 
Life and its Basis. 
[February, 
one established at the time by the power which is carrying on 
the process. But this is the same thing as giving existence 
to a new being, i.e., creation. Further, in the case of ordinary 
or dual generation, the ‘ anima ’ of the offspring would on 
the above supposition, consist of a union of the ‘ animae ’ of 
both parents; and this complication would, of course, be 
multiplied in geometrical progression at every step we take 
backward among the progenitors. On these grounds, there- 
fore, I cannot accept the common view on this subject; and 
must fall back on the far simpler theory, that the ‘ anima ’ 
is, as the Scriptures represent it to be, a direct product of 
creative power. And this applies equally to man and to beast ; 
in short, to the whole animal world. The special similarities 
of bodily form and organic character, although not always 
regular, may well be supposed to have a material connection 
with those of the parent animals; in faCt, this is the law or 
rule adopted by the Creator; and if he applies the same 
general rule to the ‘anima’ and yet allows corporeal and 
external influences to modify its character, — this appears to 
afford an adequate explanation of the principal phenomena 
of heredity. The difficulties in the path of those who are 
determined to reduce these obscure phenomena to the domain 
of physical law , are well illustrated by the scheme of M. 
Haeckel, who invents eight or ten different laws of in- 
heritance, some diametrically opposed to others. He seems 
to make a new law , to account for every difficulty. (See 
History of Creation,” vol. i., ch. viii. ix.) 
But this, like many other lines of thought, has its highest 
interest, as well as its highest development, in the human 
race. Upon the almost boundless subject, however, of human 
psychology, I cannot pretend or indeed presume to enter, 
except as to its most elementary principles. The existence 
of the human soul or living 4 anima,’ its distinctness from 
the body, and its non-material nature, however intimate are 
its present relations with its corporeity, are here assumed. 
I may go a step further, and maintain — with the writer of 
the interesting article in the last number of this Journal 
upon Comparative Psychology, — that the human ‘ psyche ’ 
is of the same order of entities as that of the lower animals. 
In that respeCt man is an animal too, and his body is 
animated by anon-material essence similar, however superior 
in intellectual and moral powers, to theirs. But similarity 
is not identity of nature : and I am very far from believing 
that any close bond of union exists between them, than that 
they are made by the same great Power, and, in that sense 
have the same origin. 
