400 An Estimate of Auguste Comte . [July, 
sions with which we are all so familiar seem to have attached 
themselves parasitically to the science at a later date. 
Or, if we turn to the medical art, the “ Papyrus Ebers,” 
dating from the sixteenth century B.C., is “ free from hocus- 
pocus and gibberish. Sorcery was forbidden in the strictest 
manner, and the alchemistic magi were punished with death 
under Ramesis III.” 
Mr. Herbert Spencer, after a careful examination of the 
genesis of Science, rejedls the Comtean phases as specially 
significant.* 
Comte’s classification of the sciences is to begin with the 
most simple and general phenomena, and to proceed to the 
most complex and particular. The sciences are thus arranged 
according to their mutual dependence. 
Here, also, we are on doubtful ground. If we arrange the 
so-called primary sciences in Comte’s series, — mathematics, 
astronomy, physics, chemistry, biology, sociology, there is no 
doubt that those which come later in the rank are indebted 
to the earlier ones both for methods and for fadts, and that 
the more the nearer they stand together. But there is also 
indebtedness in the opposite direction. Astronomy is be- 
holden to physics and chemistry for methods of investigating 
the temperatures, the nature, and even tfie movements of 
the heavenly bodies. Biology supplies chemistry with means 
of determining the molecular constitution of compounds. t 
Such cases of mutual obligation are sure to increase. 
Again, the phenomena of physics are quite as “ general ” as 
those of astronomy, since we only recognise the heavenly 
bodies by the light which they emit or refledl. It is also 
difficult to conceive that we can anywhere have matter adled 
on by certain of the forms of energy, such as heat, light, 
and eledtricity, without chemical change. Chemical pheno- 
mena are thus found co-extensive with those treated of by 
astronomy and physics. 
It would almost appear, from several passages in Comte’s 
works, as if he regarded the general as in its nature higher 
than the special. We who have been accustomed to trace 
out how an organism rises by specialisation can scarcely 
accept a line of reasoning which leads him to conclude that 
the bookseller deserves a higher rank than the author, the 
pidture-dealer than the artist, and the drysalter than the 
manufadturer who prepares some delicate colour. 
Let us now take a brief survey of Comte’s summary views 
* Mathematics cannot have had a truly theological or a metaphysical phase. 
f See Journal of Science, 1881. p. 318. 
