428 
Correspondence. 
July. 
would suggest that men’s having, in the first instance, to deal 
with, and derive their ideas from, material things, by no means 
prevents their recognition of “ higher entities,” both in themselves 
and their fellow-creatures, in after life. 
At p. 314 the writer specifies two of the chief antagonists to 
his views as being the belief in, or rather the difficulty of denying, 
the existence of an immaterial principle, or soul ; and that mat- 
ter is, in its essence, inert. It is plain, then, that Hylozoism 
denies, while Animism maintains, the existence of immaterial 
entities; andthatwhile Animism considers matter, to be inert, 
this Materialism endows it with essential activity. Let us take 
the latter thesis first. It asserts that matter is essentially adtive, 
because in a great many cases our senses do not reveal the diredt 
cause of its motions. It appears (in the case, for example, of a 
falling body) to move of itself. But will C. N. contend that 
nothing has a real existence but that which is cognisable by our 
senses ? Then he must give up his belief in the existence of 
almost every force in Nature, —e.g., magnetism or eledlricity, 
for he cannot see them ; indeed he cannot see the force in his 
own arm, he can only infer it from its visible effedls ; or , from a 
conscious feeling in his mind that he possesses it. For the very 
fadt of our consciousness that we can, at will, exert force upon 
matter, proves that there is something in our bodies superior to 
matter, and therefore necessarily distinct from, however associ- 
ated with, matter. But in the same page we are told, in a 
quotation from Dr. Lewins, that “ the anima mundi and the 
anima Humana are, at bottom, one and the same.” Then the 
soul of man does exist after all, only it is one with the anima 
mundi. Whatever may be meant by this term, it cannot but be 
an entity and a unity ; and the anima of each man must be a 
part of that unity. There is one trifling objection to this notion 
— that it is inconsistent with personal individuality ; and that 
C. N. and myself might just as well (as far as our animce are 
concerned) be called the same person — a point somewhat 
doubtful. 
But further : — neither C. N. nor Dr. Lewins actually deny the 
existence of a Supreme Intelligence or Eternal Mind ; they are 
good enough to allow that such a Being may possibly exist ; — 
though we must call them Agnostics on this point. Must not, 
then, this Being be the Anima mundi ? They admit, however, 
that there is something besides matter in the Universe ; unless 
they are prepared to adopt the only logical conclusion of their 
speculations, viz., that God and man alike are nothing but matter 
— a position which would be an edifying illustration of the insi- 
nuation against Christian Theists in the last paragraph on p. 318, 
that “ man creates a God after his own image.” 
But if there is an Infinite Mind, who can deny to it the power 
of giving existence to finite minds, call them souls or spirits, or 
what we will ? At any rate, the admission is fatal to the dodtrine 
