1 88 1.] Hylozoism versus Animism . 525 
la,tes the exit or entrance of a spiritual poison or odour; 
why then superadd a “ soul ” or thinking essence, in the 
latter ? I pass by the assertion that volition “ cannot be 
reasonably ascribed to mere matter,” only remarking that 
no property whatever can be “ reasonably ascribed ” to a 
hypothetical phantom like “ spirit.” That animal life is the 
outcome of certain chemical processes, upon which its energy 
and continuance are entirely dependent, appears to me as 
certain a proposition as that the combustion of a candle 
results from the combination of its carbon and hydrogen 
with the oxygen of the atmosphere. The two cases are 
strictly analogous; but the oxidation which sustains and 
vivifies our animal frame takes place under more complex 
conditions, and kindles a slower non-incandescent fire. 
Mr. Barker regards “ sensation as belonging to (not pro- 
ceeding from) the nervous tissue ; but perception of that 
sensation as belonging to the living anima associated with 
it, exclusively.” The distinction between “ belonging to” 
and “ proceeding from ” is not very clear ; and it is evident 
that perception, emotion, and thought are simply the special 
sensations or functions of the grey vesiculo-neurine of the 
encephalon, upon the healthy condition of which their sanity 
depends, just as sight depends on the eye and hearing on 
the ear. If matter be simply an inert machine, which must 
be kept in good order that it may obey the impulse and be- 
hests of its ghostly Archczus, how shall we account for the 
faCt that a merely physical stimulus — as of alcohol, opium, 
&c. — may suffice to change the whole current of thought 
and feeling ? Surely this is a case of the fiddle playing on 
the musician ! 
I have reserved for the conclusion of this letter a few 
remarks on Mr. Barker’s theosophistical speculations, which, 
as outside Reason, do not properly fall within the scope of 
a scientific argument. He will see, by a reference to my 
article, that the quotation from Dr. Lewins’ traCt, “ Life and 
Mind,” ran thus : — “ The question of the anima mundi and the 
anima Humana is, at bottom, one and the same.” By leaving 
out the first three words he has incorrectly construed the 
sentence into the admission of the existence of a cosmic and 
human soul. All energy is of course an attribute of some 
being, — i.e., of something which exists; but we need not 
therefore assume that this being is personal or conscious. 
Intelligent agents exercise energy ; but this does not involve 
the converse proposition, that all energy must originate in a 
conscious agent. An “ Infinite Mind ” giving “existence to 
finite minds ” must be limited by its own creations, and 
