1881J Animism versus Hylozoism. 595 
cannot, deny that atoms may at times be relatively at 
rest. 
C. N. having thought it desirable to repeat the argument 
respecting children and savages, I must revert to it in still 
plainer terms than those used in my last letter. Such reason- 
ing, if it proves anything, shows that Materialism would bring 
us "back to a state of mental barbarism and childishness, and 
limit our conceptions to that which is visible and tangible. 
It is virtually a retrograde movement, however 4 advanced * 
its advocates may fancy themselves. 
In p. 523 we have the following singular piece of rea- 
soning : — 44 Except on the principle that the half is more 
than the whole, I do not see how a perfect being can be in- 
ferior to an imperfeCt one, and the very word ‘ immaterial ’ 
implies defeCt and limitation.” Here body is called a perfedt 
whole, and the soul an imperfeCt half. But the term 44 im- 
material” implies no defeCt or imperfection ; it simply means 
not material, and, as far as the word goes, may mean unli- 
mited superiority to matter. If by “our physical structure” 
is meant our whole animated nature, I fully admit that it is 
capable of thought and sensation. But when the 4 anima 
has quitted it, the body is a carcase, incapable of either. 
In the same page we read, If will be destitute of dynamic 
power, it is a nonentity, an illusion.” 4 Will’ is certainly anon- 
entity, for it is not mind, but the working of mind ; and 
who ever calls working an entity ? And who is there that is 
not conscious, ofttimes, of having the will to aCt, without 
the power to do so ? 
The motions referred to at top of p. 524 appear to me to 
show that the brain is not the only organ by which the mind 
aCts, but that it is associated with the whole nervous system. 
Automatic motions imply, not the absence, but rather the 
presence of (unconscious) mind. All they show (in paralysis) 
is the suspension of the mind’s control over the neuro-eleCtric 
stimulus which affeCts the muscles. The actions of sleep- 
walkers decidedly prove the presence of mind, and of many 
of its faculties, though not that of consciousness. 
We are further told (p. 524) that the vis insita of matter 
etymologically means an indwelling , but practically an in- 
alienable force, which supplies the place of the Divine afflatus, 
and affords a logically sufficient 4 cause.’ ” I grant that it 
may be the proximate, but not the independent and primary 
cause. It is itself an effect , as the word insita (as used by 
Newton) shows. For it does not signify indwelling , but 
inserted or implanted (the passive participle of the verb insero), 
and implies, what Newton always maintained, a Being who 
