I88i.] 
Analyses of Books . 
747 
ceptional position can be assigned to man on that account. The 
mere existence of the very decided heel-bone in the gorilla is 
quite sufficient to overthrow the foundation of the Cuvierian 
“ Quadrumana.” As for the vertical position of man, it is evi- 
dently simply the extreme form of a graduated series. All the 
apes when sitting have their vertebral column in an almost per- 
pendicular position, and a gorilla when walking through bushes 
is very nearly eredt. 
To return to our author’s survey of the distinctions between 
man and the rest of the animals, he admits that no line of de- 
marcation can be found in the regions of the passion and 
emotions. He concedes also that man has true instindts. Nor 
does he find the boundary in intelligence, rightly pointing out 
that it is “ not the intensity of a phenomenon which gives value 
to it from our present point of view, but simply its nature .” He 
quotes the admission of the Pere de Bonniot, that animals pos- 
sess a principle superior to mere matter, and to which we may 
give the name of mind ; and that of M. 1 ’Abbe Lecomte, that 
animals reason and judge. He claims for them innate sense 
and consciousness, and if he does not also add “ reason ” it is 
because of a circumstance to which he refers below. He rejedts 
also Prof. Max Muller’s alleged “ Rubicon ” between man and 
beast, showing that here also we have gradation, but not con- 
trast. He goes on : — “ In man the existence has been proved of 
fundamental phenomena, of which nothing, either in living beings 
or inanimate bodies, has hitherto been able to give us any con- 
ception. ist. Man has the perception of moral good and evil 
independently of all physical welfare or suffering. 2nd. Man 
believes in superior beings who can exercise an influence upon 
his destiny. 3rd. Man believes in the prolongation of his exist - 
ence after this life .” 
We must entirely traverse these alleged demarcations. We 
maintain that — 
ist. The points advanced — two of them beliefs — are insuffi- 
cient to warrant the inference sought to be drawn. Suppose it 
could be shown that all dogs or all chimpanzees entertained some 
belief — whether well- or ill-founded it matters not — which was 
not shared by the rest of the animal world ; it would surely not 
warrant us in regarding them as fundamentally distinct. 
2nd. It is not demonstrated, but merely assumed, that the 
lower animals have no perception of moral good and evil, and 
have no belief in the existence of superior beings or of a future 
state. On the other hand, there are phenomena which lead us 
to believe that they have rudimentary perceptions of right and 
wrong, and even suspicions of the existence of an order of 
Nature, any departure from which inspires them with a vague 
dread. But even in the absence of any distindl evidence to such 
effedt, to follow M. de Quatrefages would be to found a classifi- 
cation upon our own ignorance ! 
