1882.J Animal Automatism. 189 
effect. What we regard as a mind in action will — according 
to Absolute Agnosticism — be only a succession of separate 
and distinct mental phenomena, not even causally related, 
since causality is only an inference from observed connection. 
But if so, there can be no such thing as the development of 
a conclusion from premises, and consequently a logical chain 
of reasoning will be impossible. Now when a “ heap or 
collection of different perceptions”* examines itself, and 
finds its supposed substance in all probability non-existent, 
its arguments are either valid or fallacious. If valid the 
“ heap ” has a more than phenomenal existence, and the 
arguments again fall to the ground. Universal scepticism 
thus places itself in the same dilemma as Epimenides the 
Cretan, when he asserted that all the Cretans were liars. 
This applies not to Hume’s philosophy, but to popular mis- 
conceptions of his true meaning, which is clearly stated in 
the following passage : — “ Thus the sceptic still continues to 
reason and believe, even though he asserts that he cannot 
defend his reason by reason ; and by the same rule he must 
assent to the principle concerning the existence of body,t 
though he cannot pretend, by any arguments of philosophy, 
to maintain its veracity. . . . We may well ask, What causes 
us to believe in the existence of body ? but it is in vain to ask 
Whether there be body or not ? That is a point which we 
must take for granted in all our reasonings.”! Hume’s real 
aim was the demonstration that the basis of reason cannot 
be derived from reason itself. Certain primary assumptions, 
not philosophically proved, but justified by intuition and 
experience, are necessities alike of abstract thought and 
practical conduct. This does not, of course, apply to hypo- 
theses such as Animism, which can be contested by non- 
suicidal arguments. 
The existence of a material proplasm of mind is implied 
by Prof. Huxley when he describes the sensorium as “ sensi- 
facient,” and consequently prior to the sensations which it 
creates. Yet, though we are forced to believe in “ mind- 
stuff,” does this in any way prove the reality of matter ? 
Since “ our sensations, our pleasures, our pains, and the 
relation of these, make up the sum total of the elements of 
positive, unquestionable knowledge,” may not the seemingly 
creative brain be itself a creation of the mind ? No man 
can examine and experiment upon his own cerebral organ ; 
* Hume’s Treatise of Human Nature, Book I., Part IV., Section 2. 
f The word “ body ” is here used as synonymous with substance , either of 
mind or matter. 
+ Ibid. 
