1882.J 
Vital and Cosmical Energy. 
253 
Could any material particle suffer a momentary loss of energy 
the seemingly passive mass of which it formed a part would 
become visibly active, and the forces hitherto counterbalanced 
would immediately assert themselves. Yet this increase of 
apparent action would be the effect of a decrease in real 
power. It appears, then, that force or energy is an inalien- 
able attribute of matter, and that the momentary suspension 
of this vis insita in any part of the universe must necessarily 
result in a world-destroying catastrophe. But as cosmic 
energy is inseparable from the material cosmos, we have 
obviously no right to invoke a spiritual agent for its produc- 
tion, unless we are prepared to isolate other properties, such 
as impenetrability and extension, and to place each under 
the charge of a special Archaeus. 
Our external Universe is, however, if not inert, at least 
for the most part unconscious. How can this deaf and blind 
and senseless dust ever bud into even the lowest form of 
mind, far less blossom into the ideal glories of the philoso- 
pher and the poet ? This objection loses its weight when 
we remember that the real problem to be solved is not — 
Can Matter think ? but — Does Matter think? We reason 
on an entirely false method when we seek to invalidate con- 
clusions derived from observation of living organisms merely 
because observation of inorganic matter does not yield all 
the data upon which such theories are founded. A particle 
of dust possesses various sensible qualities. It affedbs our 
senses of touch and sight in a special manner ; it attracts 
and is attracted by other particles. But the several kinds 
of energy which it exerts give us no a priori reason to believe 
that some or all of its constituents will at any future time 
be recombined in a living and thinking brain-cell; nor will 
our closest examination suffice to discover any sign of such 
a destiny. Now statements such as this, not unfrequently 
dwelt upon by Dualists, are distinguished by perfect truth, 
but also by perfedt irrelevance. We can only convince our- 
selves that Matter can think, by the observation of thinking 
matter. To infer that a nerve cannot feel because a straw 
is insensate, is as absurd as to conclude that, since ice makes 
us feel cold, boiling water cannot make us feel hot. In both 
cases there is a graduated scale between the two extremes, 
represented in the latter by a regularly intensified heat- 
quiver, in the former by a slowly increasing complexity of 
organisation, from which are at length evolved the first faint 
and doubtful rudiments of consciousness. 
It seems now scarcely necessary to do more than mention 
the second fallacy with which we have to deal. This is 
