1882.] Comparative Psychology 635 
workings of some especial unitary faculty, standing in the 
stead of reason. 
But the definition of “ instindl ” tacitly held by the out- 
side public, and by those whom we may call naturalists of 
the Old School, is something different from that quoted 
above. They pronounce it a divinely implanted faculty 
given to the lower animals instead of understanding. Hence 
they by implication, at least, denied its presence in man. 
Now if “ instindl ” were a divinely implanted faculty, we 
may safely assume that it would never prove mistaken and 
misleading. Yet such errors have been observed from the 
time when Gilbert White described the martins building 
their nests in the angles of a window too shallow to afford 
due support to the structure, to the more recent case where 
Mr. Wallace saw Rhyncophorus beetles boring into gummy 
wood and being held fast by the glutinous fluid. 
The believers in “ instindl ” as a something exclusive of 
reason will, if they carefully examine the question, find 
themselves surrounded with difficulties. If they incline to 
the unitary or monistic view of Nature, they must regard 
both reason and “ instindl ” — or, if they prefer the term, 
“ ^wtfsf-intelligence ” — as fundlions of the brain. But if we 
take strudlures so nearly alike as the brains respedlively of 
the higher apes and of man, we may well ask — How can the 
fundlions of these organs differ not merely in degree, but in 
kind ? If they suppose — as we believe some do — that the 
mind of man is a spiritual principle, whilst brutes are 
totally material, we crave to know how “ mere matter ” can 
in the ape perform adlions so closely resembling those which 
in man require the co-operation of matter and spirit ? To 
say that this similarity is divinely ordained is to assume the 
existence of a “ Deus quidem deceptov ,” just as was involved 
in the old notion of fossils being not the remains of animals 
once existing, but objedls specially created. If, again, we 
assume that the intelligence of man and the “ quasi- intelli- 
gence ” of the ape are both in their essence spiritual, we 
have then two immaterial principles using tools the 
brain) very similar, producing results very similar, and yet 
differing not in grade merely, but toto ccelo . We would com- 
mend these questions to the consideration of thinkers. 
But if we consider instindl in man or beast to be merely 
hereditary aptitude, called into play by appropriate circum- 
stances, the difficulties of the case vanish so rapidly that we 
may expedl their entire disappearance at an early date. We 
see, in fadl, new instindls being created in this manner. On 
this point the well-known case of young pointer dogs is 
2 T 2, 
