-662 Force and Matter. ^November* 
nourishment. Not so life, at least in any individual organism. 
No amount of food will enable any of the higher animals or 
plants to live on indefinitely. 
Organic life is periodic or cyclical, — combustion not so. 
The organism has a fixed term of existence, and can grow 
and propagate itself only during certain terms of its exist- 
ence, after which it dies away. Flame, if fuel is supplied, 
may not only last for ever, but can grow and propagate (the 
two processes being here one) during any part of its exist- 
ence. But there is yet a more important distin< 5 tion : — 
Suppose life extirpated on a planet, or on a single continent, 
all introduction of ova, seeds, germs, whatever being rigor- 
ously excluded, none of the forms of energy with which we 
are acquainted can call organisms, even of the humblest 
grade, into being. Life can only, within our experience, 
spring from antecedent life. With flame the case is quite 
otherwise. It can be kindled without antecedent flame, so long 
as the necessary materials are not wanting. Mechanical 
work can generate combustion, as when the savage kindles 
a fire by rubbing two sticks together. Chemical action can 
pass into flame, as when greasy cotton-waste sets fire to a 
work-shop. EleCtric action by a due arrangement can set 
fire to any suitable material, though no flame may exist 
within ten miles of the spot. 
The fundamental attributes and the necessary conditions 
of life are self-regulation and super-compensation of waste. 
Where we find these, or where we trace arrangements for 
their production and marks of their presence, we recognise 
an organism or its remains. 
VI. FORCE AND MATTER. 
By S. Billing. 
<t± 
S N the correspondence of the “Journal of Science,” May, 
1881, is a letter signed “ A Lucretian.” He asks, “ Can 
any of your anti-monistic contributors reply to the 
following argument of Dr. Buchner’s ? — “ It is evident that a 
force can only exist in as far as it is aCtive ; but a creative 
force, the first cause of the world, could therefore exist 
neither before nor after creation, since both before and after 
