124 The Brain Theory of Mind and Matter . [March, 
that such a thing is possible, demonstrate by their contra- 
diction its impossibility. But supposing for a moment that 
this inconceivable power could be gained, its possessor would 
probably perceive nothing which could distinguish the origin 
of light from the origin of sound or odour. It is well known 
that one and the same cause, such as an eleCtric shock or 
abnormal distension of the capillaries, will produce different 
effects in the various organs of sense. The eye may see 
flashes of lightning ; the ear may hear the sound of a gong; 
the skin may feel acute pain ; or rather the brain may 
transmute identical stimuli, conveyed to it by different chan- 
nels, into results which are not only dissimilar, but actually 
have nothing in common. Since the dissimilarity does not 
come from without, it must come from within ; therefore we 
arrive at the conclusion that the world is made inside, and 
not outside, the cerebrum. Although rejecting that Abso- 
lute Idealism which will deny the existence of aught that is 
corporeal, even of the sensifacient hemispheres and the 
sensiferous nerves, we are forced to accept that Relative 
Idealism which declares that the only Cosmos known to 
man, or in any way concerning him, is manufactured in his 
own brain-cells. Far more truly than the painter “ creates ” 
the picture from elaborated materials already provided for 
him by “ Nature,” every one of us creates Nature herself, in a 
tiny cerebral studio, without pencil and without pigment. We 
make the mountains, and the sea, and the sun himself ; for 
sunshine is nothing if not visible, and if there were no eye 
and no brain there could be no sunshine. 
These truths are so self-evident that it seems superfluous 
to quote authorities in their support. It may, however, not 
be altogether useless to refer my readers to the recent trans- 
lation of Kant’s “ Critique of Pure Reason,” by Professor 
Max Miiller, and also to a very able though not perfectly 
consistent article on the great German philosopher in the 
current number of the “ Edinburgh Review.” The follow- 
ing sentences from the latter are especially applicable : — 
“ Kant’s whole system throughout is nothing but the 
question underlying all philosophy, and which Hume had 
made clear as day, in language for ever intelligible to all 
educated minds — the question, namely, whether we can 
really know things or only thoughts, whether our knowledge 
is objective or only subjective. It cuts up by the roots for 
ever, when understood, the empirical pretensions which 
have again imposed on so many minds in our time.” 
Again — “ Kant answers the problem, How is Science pos- 
sible ? or, as he elsewhere puts it, How are objects or 
