1883.] Analyses of Books. 229 
principle is by no means banished from the research if we are 
led to it by consequent thought, based upon experience.” 
The monistic interpretation of the universe, whether panthe- 
istic or materialistic, breaks down from its incapacity to explain 
from a unitary principle the difference between matter and spirit. 
The Pantheist is unable to explain the duality of matter and 
spirit, in which the One Substance appears to itself ; the Mate- 
rialist is incapable of showing how phenomena of motion can 
become spiritual processes. Hence it must be admitted that the 
above-mentioned interpretations of the world — the only ones 
which man can conceive — are not even able to grasp satisfactorily 
the phenomenal side of Nature, much less to admit of a con- 
clusion as to the essence of the order of the world. The author, 
reminding his readers of the necessarily phenomenal character 
of our knowledge, views in Monism and Dualism schemes of the 
mind, each having a “ one-sided justification ” which we may 
recognise without raising against the former the charge of 
Atheism and immorality, or against the latter the accusation of 
credulity and superstition. 
Whilst, however, thus seeking to recognise in each of these 
interpretations of the universe its valuable element, he declares 
himself an adherent of Dualism, founding his choice upon the 
dodlrine of cognition. In this recognition of spirit and matter 
as the two substantial entities which make up the world, he fol- 
lows the footsteps of Darwin, as it appears from the concluding 
passage of the “ Origin of Species.” He even considers — like 
not a few philosophic naturalists, both of his own country and 
of America — that Dualism will be of more service to the Dar- 
winian than Monism. Combating the views of Haeckel, he 
emphasises the distinctions between the organism and organic 
individuals — crystals. He argues that no crystal is capable of 
reproduction. But we may here ask whether he has sufficiently 
borne in mind that, in the lower forms of life, reproduction, the 
increase of the species, is not so sharply differentiated from nu- 
trition, the increase of the individual, as in the higher groups. 
Nor can we agree with him in maintaining that “ every indivi- 
dual, even before its birth, carries in it the germs of death.” 
We have some time ago shown that death is not the necessary 
lot of all living. 
Whilst admitting the possibility that modern chemistry may 
succeed in the synthesis of all organic compounds, he maintains 
that, even were it possible to form artificially an entire animal, 
not merely chemically, but structurally, identical with those we 
meet with in the world, it would be a mere corpse, without an 
immaterial something. Nevertheless he holds that every vital 
process, regarded in itself, is the result of material processes, or, 
in other words, a phenomenon of motion. 
In the remaining chapter, which the want of space prevents 
us from examining in detail, the author discusses, from an 
