1883.I Canine Intelligence . 733 
guess what the world of the dog is like. Both in the nature 
and amount of its thought, and in the nature and amount of 
its feeling, — both in its perceptions and in its emotions, — is 
the canine mind a mystery to us. 
But have we any warrant for speaking of thought or of 
feeling as even existing for the dog ? Can we properly speak 
of a canine mind at all ? In their answer to this question 
untutored Common Sense and the Philosophy of Evolution 
are at one. It may be a mind of which we know, and from 
the nature of the case can know, very little ; but that there 
is a brute consciousness clown and naturalist agree. We 
only know of its existence by inference it is true. Conscious- 
ness cannot a< 5 t on consciousness except by means that are 
indirect. Mind can never come into direcft contact with 
mind. But that our brothers and sisters have minds like 
our own, and that Carlo and Pincher have a consciousness 
that foreshadows our own, is a belief that emerges in child- 
hood, and one that can be justified at a period of maturer 
thought. The doctrine that animals are automata does not 
touch this question, for none of the arguments on which 
that view is based deal at all with the question of conscious- 
ness. If they be automata, there is nothing to show that 
they are not conscious automata. From the nature of their 
adtions we are impelled to believe that, automata or non- 
automata, they are conscious. And the dodtrine of Evolu- 
tion has furnished a firm basis for that belief. Rejedt that 
dodtrine, and this firm basis is destroyed. You are ready, 
with Prof. Max Muller, “ to say again and again that, ac- 
cording to the stridt rules of positive Philosophy, we have 
no right to assert or deny anything with reference to the so- 
called Mind of animals.” There are many, however, who 
regard this belief in animal consciousness as a legitimate 
scientific conclusion based on the dodtrine of Evolution. As 
such I for one am content to accept it. 
Accepting, however, this belief in animal consciousness, 
we must still remember that both as a product and as a. process 
animal thought can only be dimly guessed at. As a produdt 
we are unable to form any adequate conception of the pidture 
of his surroundings that exists in Carlo’s mind. Nor can 
we by observation learn anything very definite of Carlo’s 
thought as a process. We are forced to judge entirely by 
inference from observed adtions. Even with human beings 
this is not always by any means a safe process. Still more 
unsafe is it in dealing with the lower animals. 
Are we, then, to leave this subjedt of Animal Intelligence 
or Canine Intelligence, to put it in a concrete form, on one 
