1884.] Canine Intelligence. 11 
conduct according to circumstances, we cannot but call their 
actions intelligent. 
Nor have I space to enter upon the emotional character 
of the dog. This, too, I must leave the reader to fill in from 
his own observation. What I wish to do now is to enquire 
whether we may apply the term rational to the actions of the 
dog ? May we speak of Reason in the lower animals ? Or 
must we speak of intelligence only, or intellect, and hold 
that man is the only rational creature ? That, I think, de- 
pends entirely upon our definition of Reason. The word 
Reason is used in a wider and in a narrower sense. In the 
wider sense it is antithetical to Instinct ; in the narrower, it 
is the process of abstract thought effected through the 
medium of signs written or spoken. If we accept the former, 
and regard a rational act as one performed in special adapta- 
tion to special circumstances, I do not see how the term rational 
can be denied to such adts as we see daily performed by dogs 
of very average ability. If we maintain the latter view, and 
hold that Reason is abstract thought carried on by means of 
language, I do not see how the term rational can be applied 
to any animal adt whatever. 
The question, however, arises how far we have any right 
to restridt the word Reason in this way ? All processes of 
thought are carried on by association of ideas; and in the 
chain of association there may be links of all kinds furnished 
by all the senses we possess. Man adds to the natural links 
in this chain of association certain arbitrary symbols of his 
own manufacture ; and we call these arbitrary symbols 
words. But does the introduction of these special links in 
the chain cause the association to differ in kind from that in 
which such links are absent ? If it does, then we may fairly 
apply the term reason to this special form of mental action, 
and hold that reason is distinctive of man. But if the nature 
of the association does not differ in kind, then let us not deny 
to Diamond his share in the rational faculty which gave to 
his master his proud pre-eminence. 
In this connection it is impossible to avoid some allusion 
to the question how far animals have the power of forming 
abstract ideas. Let us first hear what Mr. Romanes, a 
recognised authority, writes. “ Give a cat or dog,” he says, 
“ some kind of meat or cake which the animal has never 
before met with, and the careful examination which the 
morsel undergoes before it is consigned to the mouth proves 
that the animal has properly abstract ideas of sweet, bitter, 
hot, nauseous, or, in general, good for eating and bad for eat- 
i ng—i.e., abstract ideas of quality as apart from the object 
