3:884.] 
u Ultimate Religious, Ideas” 
507 
creation, by whatever means it was evolved, contains within 
itself the potence of development, and the application of 
this principle extends from the minutest thing to a Universe. 
To carry out the reasonings adopted by Mr. Spencer : — 
It would seem we cannot represent in thought that of which 
we know not the beginning. We are conscious of intelli- 
gence, but we do not know its origin. We have present 
with us, as fadts, life energies (living things), but we know 
not their whence; the Science of Huxley and the Mate- 
rialism of Haeckel are equally at fault. We handle the 
seeds of plants ; we know (generally) what will result from 
them, but we know nothing of their hidden and regulating 
potence why an acorn should develope into an oak, or why 
the winged integuments of the dandelion should reproduce 
its parent. In animal generation the mystery is the same ; 
we can follow the processes of formation, but we know 
nothing of the directing energy through which the result is 
determined. There is no lack of examples ; we see the 
origin, but know nothing of the pusher and puller. The 
fadt (worth a million of hypotheses) that the naturalist 
attempts to account for the various results is at least a proof 
that they are capable “ of being represented in thought.” 
“ Creation by external agency,” that is “ that the genesis 
of the heavens and the earth is effedted somewhat after the 
manner in which a workman shapes a piece of furniture.” 
“ This assumption is not that of theologians only, but of an 
immense number of philosophers, both past and present. 
It is found in the teachings of Plato, and in the writing of 
not a few living men of Science.” “ The conception is not 
even consistent in itself, and cannot be realised in thought 
when all its assumptions are granted.” 
If an assumption is granted it must be conceived for the 
purpose as a fact, and can be realised in thought even al- 
though the basis on which it is built be utterly false, for the 
concession does away with all difficulty in the way of proof. 
If creation means such external agency as quoted in the 
text (carpentry), reasoning on things would pronounce it to 
be without foundation ; for if it were true, the lines in the 
wings of an insedf, as well as the delicate tints of colour on 
the wings of a butterfly, or the more stupendous mechanism 
of Nature, would all owe their advent to such an adl. Such 
a conception appears, when examined, to be impossible ; but 
if a more rational view be taken, and one more consistent 
with the notion of Deity and the fadls of Science is pre- 
sented, — viz., a creation by law and from a germ projected 
with the genesis of phenomena, — then creation by external 
2 L 2 
