604 
Analyses oj Books. 
[October, 
rejecting certain errors concerning “ instindt.” He writes : 
<< it is not an uncommon idea to contrast instindt and reason, as 
though they were opposite in their nature and the one exclude 
the other. The real fadt of the case is that, so far from being 
opposites, they are fundamentally identical. Instindt is reason, 
but reason in its undeveloped, semi-unconscious, and wholly 
voluntary form.” He goes on, however “ The primordial m- 
stindts we have just referred to (e.g., the tendency of the new- 
born baby to suck) are the first efforts of reason to awaken from 
its slumber, and to commence a new and conscious life in con- 
nection with the higher organism which human nature presents. 
Has reason then existed before the organism, and has it passed 
an unconscious life in connedtion with some lower organism . 
In his fifth chapter the author reviews the materialistic hypo- 
thesis, to which he opposes the two following arguments 
“ That no one knows what matter is, so that when we have 
succeeded in reducing mind to matter we are really no nearer to 
any valid solution of the difficulty of the case than we weie 
before. Matter, after all, may perhaps be reducible to force 
(energy), and force to spirit, as its source and spring. 
To this contention the materialist might reply that an analysis 
by which the two supposed substantive entities, mind and matter, 
should be reduced into one, would be a distindt gain, even if the 
remaining one were still an unknown quantity. To take a parallel 
case if the three halogens, chlorine, bromine, and iodine, were 
all found to be reducible to one, chemists would experience lively 
satisfaction, even though the origin and ultimate nature of that 
one should remain inscrutable. 
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The second argument is much more weighty: — “ that the 
material forces from which mind is supposed to emanate aie, as 
far as all our experience goes, uniform and constant in their ope- 
rations, while in every single mind we have a separate and 
distindt individuality. How any combination of chemical, elec- 
trical, or other physical forces, passing through any conceivable 
kind of organic instrumentality, could result in the infinite vari- 
ations of human individuality is quite beyond our power ot 
conception, and is alone sufficient to stamp Materialism as 
inadequate to sum up the fadts of the case intelligibly into a 
scientific formula.” , 
Another theory brought forward — we remark m passing that 
the author does not, in some cases at least, distinguish- between 
“ hypothesis ” and “ theory ”— is that which regards mind as 
a “ special manifestation of the Absolute thought.” '1 his, also, 
the author sets aside as incapable of accounting for the fadts ol 
individuality. . . , , . , „ . 
The ordinary dualistic theory views mind and body as twe 
wholly distindt existences with a temporary and partial connec 
tion but still carrying on their respedtive fundtions quite inde 
pendently of each other.” This supposition, also, is inadequate 
