1884. J 
Scientific Nomenclature. 
209 
I shall begin by admitting that in every science a fixed — 
and if possible an international — nomenclature is necessary, 
as well for the objects we study as for the changes they un- 
dergo and the operations we perform on or with them. We 
want names for animals, plants, minerals, chemical com- 
pounds, stars, &c., just as we need them for men, towns, or 
countries. Without such names our observations and expe- 
riments are a mere waste of time, since we can neither 
communicate our results to others, nor even preserve them 
for our own future reference. Hence, therefore, we need a 
precise nomenclature. There must be no room for doubt, at 
distant places or in future times, as to what species or what 
objedt our researches refer. One of the chief difficulties 
encountered in utilising the scientific works of antiquity, or 
of the earlier ages of the modern world, depends on this very 
lack of nomenclature. 
But here, at the very outset, we meet with a difficulty 
which splits up the followers of Science into two hostile 
camps. They will all agree that the names we employ 
should not be taken from the living language of any civilised 
nation, since they would thus be ipso facto objectionable or 
useless to other nations. They will grant that our nomen- 
clature should be formed from some dead or dying tongue, 
which may be the common property of all. Some even 
restrict this principle, by insisting further that the Greek 
and Latin languages, and no other, should supply us with 
the needful material. 
l'he next requisite is that the names of species — organic, 
mineral, or chemical — should, like the names of stars, be 
very short. The reason for this is that long names need- 
lessly burden the memory, and occasion much waste of time 
in transcribing and labelling. One of the greatest educa- 
tional advantages of the physical and natural sciences, as 
distinguished from classical and linguistic studies, is that 
the latter appeal almost exclusively to the faculty of verbal 
memory, whilst the sciences cultivate mainly the power of 
observation and of interrogating Nature systematically, and 
of drawing right conclusions from the phenomena observed. 
Now the more cumbrous and long-winded we make our no- 
menclature, the more we sacrifice this advantage, and make 
Science an affair of memory. 
Here, then, the question is raised — What can we fairly 
and justly demand from the name (say) of a plant, or a fish, 
or a mineral, or a chemical compound ? 
To the one party, among which 1 must claim to be in- 
cluded, the name is merely a mark for identifying the thing. 
