1884.] 
66i 
Question of Evolution. 
It need be merely mentioned that Mr. Butler, though a 
decided Evolutionist, is an equally decided rejeCtor of the 
principle of Natural Selection. This rejection he has re- 
coided in very plain language, going so far as to assert that 
Mr. Darwin and his colleagues and followers have left the 
doCtiine of Evolution in a less intelligible state than they 
found it. He traces instinCt — not unhappily — to inherited 
memory. He makes a great point of the distinction be- 
tween conscious and unconscious knowledge, asserting that 
so long as we are conscious of our knowledge such know- 
ledge is imperfect. 
. Passing over many other instances adduced as illustra- 
tions, we will select the tollowingin virtue of its familiarity: 
faking, then, the act of playing the piano as an example 
of the kind of action we are in search of, we observe that a 
piaCtised player will perform very difficult pieces apparently 
without effort, often, indeed, while thinking and talking of 
something quite other than his music. ... He finds it 
difficult to remember even the difficulties he experienced in 
learning to play. A few may have so impressed him that 
they remain with him, but the greater part will have es- 
caped him as completely as the remembrance of what he 
ate or how he put on his clothes this day ten years ago ; 
neveitheless it is plain that he does in reality remember 
moie than he remembers remembering. . . . We draw the 
inleience, therefore, as regards pianoforte or violin playing, 
that the more the familiarity or knowledge of the art (mark 
the term art !) the less is there consciousness of such know- 
ledge. . . . On the other hand, we observe that the less 
the familiarity or knowledge the greater the consciousness 
of whatever knowledge there is. Conscious knowledge and 
volition are ot attention ; attention is of suspense ; suspense 
is of doubt; doubt is of uncertainty; uncertainty is of ig- 
norance ; so that the mere faCt of conscious knowledge or 
willing implies the presence of more or less novelty and 
doubt.” 
It may here be objected that Mr. Butler is confounding 
two different kinds ot knowledge, or rather two things which 
are unfortunately confounded under the term “ knowledge.” 
There is the knowledge which expresses itself in art, and 
which may and does become unconscious as it reaches per- 
fection. There is the knowledge which when organised 
becomes Science. And these two are not one. 
It is a fearful mistake to assert even that, in the sphere 
of practical art, if a man can do a thing he knows how to 
do it, — i. e., that he knows the principles upon which it is 
