i S84-] Hylo-Idealism : a Defence. 699 
a chain of feelings, or, as he calls them, of impressions and 
ideas, the latter being “ copies ” of the former. We shall 
see later that this word “ copies ” contains in itself the 
refutation of Universal Scepticism. But the Ego, considered 
as an , Entity which manifests itself in “ impressions and 
ideas, and links them into an organic whole, was to Hume 
as pure a fidtion as Matter was to Berkeley. 
It is not necessary that we should proceed beyond Hume. 
None of the great German philosophers has really turned 
his position, and if we desire to ground ourselves thoroughly 
we must return to Hume, and face his problem. 
First, it must be admitted that Hume is quite right in 
considering the existence of the Ego as a pure assumption ; 
but it can be shown that philosophy without assumptions is 
unthinkable. I do not, however, invite my readers to assume 
anything so debateable as the Ego. I ask them to assume 
only what the sceptic himself tacitly assumes when he begins 
to reason, and that is the possibility of reasoning. As I have 
elsewhere remarked, to reason in defence of reason is to 
beg the question, — to reason against reason is to commit 
suicide.* 
Let us see what our assumption involves. It involves 
the belief that our ideas have some relation to objects, and 
our concepts to ideas ;f the belief, that is, that it is possible 
to remember, and to think. 
But what is the relationship which we have thus as- 
serted ? When we call to mind the concept, say, of a pin, 
we know that this concept is derived from various mental 
images of pins which we have formed from time to time. 
We know that these mental images were adtual re-presenta- 
tions of certain objects or grouping sensations, including 
hardness, brightness, slenderness, sharpness. Conversely, 
fadts about pins not yet seen may be deduced from the 
concept, — as that they will prick, and will bend if subjected 
* St. Augustine says “ Everyone who knows that he doubts, knows some- 
thing that is true, and is certain of what he knows Therefore no one 
who can doubt at all ought to doubt that there is such a thing as Truth.” 
Again, he says, “ Men have doubted whether the vital force is of air, or of 
fire ; but who doubts that he himself lives and remembers, and understands 
and wills, and thinks and knows and judges ? Seeing that even if he doubts, 
he lives ; if he doubts, he remembers why he doubts ; if he doubts, he under- 
stands that he doubts ; if he doubts, he wishes to be certain ; if he doubts, he 
thinks ; if he doubts, he knows that he is ignorant ; if he doubts, he judges 
that he should not venture to assert.” 
f I use the term “ idea ” in the sense of a mental image of a sensation, 
an objedt, or a relationship ; the term “ concept ” in the sense of a generalised 
idea, formed by the juxtaposition of two or more mental images, the rejection 
of the points in which they differ, and the retention of those which they have 
in common. 
3 A2 
