700 Hylo-Idealism : a Defence. [December, 
to sufficient pressure. Here we have a simple case of in- 
ductive and deductive reasoning. 
We are also sure that the concept could not precede the 
idea, nor the idea the object. If it could be so, we should 
be able to remember things before they happened, and to 
reason about them before we remembered them. The future 
would be chronicled like the past. 
The objeCt, then, is not an accidental, but a necessary, 
antecedent of the idea and the concept. And this is equi- 
valent to the assertion that the successive members of a 
chain of reasoning do not merely succeed, but also influence 
each other. They are not a mere series of dissolving views, 
which can be arranged in any order. There is an aCtual 
genetic connexion* between them. But in this case they must 
be something more than passive pictures ; for genesis implies 
aCtion. 
What, then, are we to say about feelings, states of con- 
sciousness, or (to employ a useful term) psychoses, since 
they are not to be spoken of as “ passive pictures ” ? Evi- 
dently we must say that there is more in them than the 
mere appearance ; because an appearance, qua appearance, 
can only be passive : therefore we are forced to the conclu- 
sion that they are manifestations of some aCtive Entity, 
some “ Ding-an-sich,” which shows itself in each member, 
and unites the whole together in a definite manner. I say 
Entity, rather than entities, because the plexus of psychoses 
called the mind forms in a very intelligible sense a unity, 
though the conception of unity is of course always relative, 
and there is no possible unity which may not, under some 
light, be considered as a multiplicity. The sentient and 
thinking “ Thing-in-itself ” ( noumenon ), at which we have at 
last arrived, may be termed the Ego. 
Leaving this part of our subject for the present, let us 
turn to consider the relation between the Ego and its envi- 
ronment, — if, indeed, it have any environment. Having 
faced Hume’s problem, let us next face Berkeley’s. 
We find that the sphere of consciousness may be roughly 
divided into two parts, which may provisionally (though in- 
accurately) be called the inner and the outer. 
The inner includes mental and physical pains and 
pleasures, desires, volitions, ideas, and concepts. All these 
I shall group under the name of feelings. The outer is 
composed of objects and their perceived relationship. This 
outer region I may call the realm of phenomena. 
* I use the term “ genetic ” in preference to the term “ causal,” as less 
suggestive of obsolete ideas. 
