Hylo-Idealism : a Defence. 701 
Having established the existence of the Ego, we now 
proceed to ask whether there is anything besides the Ego ? 
Is the. world simply the product of the individual mind ? 
Are objects mere mental phantasms, or are they manifesta- 
tions of adtive entities which co-operate with the Ego ? 
lo answer this question we must separate them into three 
classes. 
1 he majority of the objedts which we perceive have no 
diredt and constant relation to our mental and physical pains 
and pleasures, and do not obey our volitions. Neither do 
they seem to have any feelings of their own. Such are 
stones, gases, plants. These appear to adt and readt upon 
each other : I say appear, because I do not wish to assume 
at present that there is any reality corresponding to this 
appearance, or that a rock or a tree is anything more than 
a group of phenomena. If we investigate more closely, we 
notice that every adtion is followed by a readtion, and that 
the readtion always bears definite quantitative relation to 
the adtion. We noticed nothing of the kind when dealing 
with ideas and concepts, because neither an idea nor a con- 
cept admits of quantitative measurement. 
But these apparent adtions and readtions among objedts 
are not necessarily accompanied by any feeling in the per- 
cipient, beyond the visual and mental one of perceiving 
them ; that is, when you see one stone strike against another 
you do not feel hurt, unless your finger or some other part 
of your body be in the way. 
But this brings us to the second class of objedts, which 
consists, for each individual, of one member, or rather of a 
complexus of members. When any part of this complexus 
is touched, he feels ; when one part of it touches another, 
he can distinguish two sensations. When it is injured, he 
is hurt ; and its movements correspond with his volitions. 
This he names his body. 
Let us enquire what he notes with regard to it. This 
plexus of phenomena, called body, is closely connedted with 
a plexus of feelings, called mind. Take a very simple ex- 
ample showing this connexion — the prick of a pin. A bright, 
sharp, smooth, hard objedt, of a certain size and shape, is 
perceived by sight and feeling in a definite position with 
regard to that group of phenomena known as the finger. 
The skin is pundtured ; blood flows. A sharp pain is felt, 
and the hand is snatched away. But this is not the end of 
the matter. Several ideas have been generated, — the mental 
image of the pin, of the prick, of the blood, of the pain, and 
of the consequent movement ; and these are henceforth 
