702 
Hylo-Idealism : a Defence. 
[December, 
inseparably associated. When we have been pricked more 
than once they are generalised into concepts, and the sight 
or touch of a pin henceforth arouses a volition prompting 
us to avoid treading on it or sticking it into our finger. 
Here, according to previous admission, the idea of the pin 
is derived from the phenomenal objedt, and the concept from 
the union of two or more ideas. And if we shut our eyes 
no pin will be seen, and no visual mental image formed, so 
that the intervention of the eye is a necessary link in the 
chain. In like manner the pain of the prick is only an 
intensification of the sense of contadt ; and if the finger 
were not presented there would be no prick, and no pain, 
and therefore no subsequent idea of the pain. So that we 
have the two chains, of feelings and of phenomena, appa- 
rently interfering with each other ; we have members of the 
one set standing in genetic relationship to members of the 
other. Indeed, as we have seen, this happens whenever an 
objedt is succeeded by its correspondent idea. 
Two questions here suggest themselves. One is, the old 
and still unanswered query — Are the pin and the finger too 
mere mental phantasms, or have they any other kind of 
existence? The other is — Have we any reason to believe 
that either chain is broken ; that, for instance, a phenome- 
non may be succeeded by a feeling, coming instead of another 
phenomenon ? Or are the two chains collateral, the ap- 
pearance of a link in the one being in some way essential to 
the appearance of a link in the other, yet being always fol- 
lowed by a link of its own kind ? The only modifications 
that the individual can see in his body are the pundture and 
the flowing blood. But does the modification end here ? 
Are there no other physical changes which might be rendered 
apparent to the senses, if there were anyone to trace them ? 
These questions we can answer only by proceeding to the 
third class of objedts. 
The Ego is not alone with the body, and with the world of 
non-sentient objedts. Other objedts are perceived, resembling 
in all important particulars the percipient’s own body, and 
appearing to adt in a similar manner. When these adt on 
one another he does not feel anything, but he cannot help 
inferring that they do ; or rather, that feelings resembling 
his own are connedted with these bodies which resemble his 
own. “ How this inference is justified,” says Prof. Clifford, 
“ I do not pretend to say.” * It cannot be justified by 
reason, but it is a procedure such as forms the very basis of 
* In his Essay “ On the Nature of Things in Themselves.” 
