[December, 
7° 4 Hylo-Idealism : a Defence. 
be excited by stimulants the emotions are produced in excess, 
and the thinking powers, while at first heightened, are after- 
wards diminished. I find (in the words of Professor Huxley) 
that “ the brain is the organ of sensation, thought, and 
emotion — i.e., some change in the condition of the matter 
of this organ is the invariable antecedent of the state of 
consciousness to which each of these terms is applied.” 
This statement is complete, with Prof. Clifford’s important 
supplement that “ some other change is the invariable con- 
comitant of sensation, thought, and emotion. The two 
series — of psychoses and neuroses — are parallel so far as 
they run together, but they are not co-extensive. There is 
no psychosis without a corresponding neurosis, but there 
are neuroses without corresponding psychoses. The psy- 
choses are concomitant with those neuroses only which 
take place in the brain, though genetically connected with 
others taking place in remote parts of the body. And 
neither chain is ever opened to admit the intercalation of a 
member of the other series. 
When we find this mutual influence and parallelism be- 
tween the two series, and reflect that, while each consists of 
manifestations of an active Entity, there is yet not a particle 
of evidence for imagining that there are two of these entities 
running parallel and interacting : when we further consider 
that this clumsy dualistic supposition can be traced to the 
fancies and dreams of savages, we shall soon be landed, 
willingly or unwillingly, in philosophic Monism. We shall 
be led to the conclusion that there is one “ Ding-an-sich,” of 
which both mind and body are phenomena ; and that an aCt 
of this Entity which from one side appears as a change in 
the condition of the cerebral cortex, from the other side 
appears as a thought or emotion. Why there should be the 
two sides no one can say; but neither can anyone say why 
there should be the one side. 
Dualism involves not merely the initial assumption of two 
Entities, but a long chain of assumptions, increasing as it 
proceeds in complexity, difficulty, and inconsistency. For 
instance, we have to imagine either that Spirit can aCt and 
be aCted upon by pulls and pushes, or that Matter can aCt 
and be aCted upon otherwise than by pulls and pushes, 
which, in ordinary experience, constitute the only mode in 
which it can make or receive impressions. On the former 
theory Spirit must have material attributes ; on the latter 
Matter must have spiritual attributes. But Spirit with 
material attributes is conscious Matter ; while Matter with 
spiritual attributes is corporeal Spirit. On either supposition 
one of the two Entities is superfluous. 
