JOURNAL OF S C I E N C E. 
FEBRUARY, 1885. 
I. THE LESSONS OF THE “MIGNONETTE” 
CASE. 
ODERN researches on brain-diseases— whether tem- 
porary or persistent, functional or organic — have 
led to results which the moralist and the legist, 
however reluctantly, will find themselves bound to consider. 
“ Reluctantly,” we say, because such consideration cannot 
fail to invalidate some of the dogmas of the former and to 
scatter the precedents of the latter. 
Setting aside certain palaeozoic writers who still view 
insanity not as disease, but as sin, and in itself worthy of 
penalties, we find amongst all who examine the subject a 
full consent. All agree that the man “out of his mind” 
cannot be treated as either morally or legally responsible 
for his actions. If such a man commits any crime he can- 
not, it is admitted, be condemned and punished like a sane 
man, though the public safety demands that he shall be 
placed where he can injure neither himself nor anyone 
else. 
This principle, universally admitted in civilised countries, 
is carried into practice in various ways. In England the 
trial of the accused begins in the ordinary fashion, but his 
counsel raises the plea of insanity. If this plea is esta- 
blished by the evidence of the medical experts called, the 
judge directs a verdict of “ Not guilty ” to be entered, and 
the prisoner is sentenced to be placed in confinement during 
Her Majesty’s pleasure. Sometimes it may happen that 
sentence — say of death — is passed in the ordinary form, but 
VOL. VII. (THIRD SERIES). F 
