1885.] 
Ignoramus et Ignorabimus. 
465 
HI. IGNORAMUS ET IGNORABIMUS. 
^^J E , Ca - Science the intei 'Pi-etation and the compre- 
hension of the Universe. Yet considerations to 
.which we cannot close our eyes force us to own 
that the interpretation is vague and arbitrary, and the com- 
prehension in the very last degree fragmentary. It is well 
to. reflect how much in our systems is taken for granted 
without proof, and how very narrow are the limits of our 
knowledge. Indeed “ narrow ” is not the correct term. We 
can nowhere draw a boundary line and say that everything 
within such line is clearly understood, and that our know- 
ledge of it is brought into an organic, and therefore 
harmonious, co-ordination. The unknown and the unknow- 
able intersect, and even underlie, the known. In the 
memorable discourse from which we have taken the title of 
oui piesent lefleCtions it is shown that we can no more un- 
derstand the origin and the nature of matter than that of 
life and feeling. Here, surely, we have too wide and 
bottomless chasms beneath the very foundations of our 
knowledge. True we may ignore these chasms, trying to 
peisuade oui selves, with Comte, that Science does not con- 
cern itself with origins and natures. The world does not 
accept this self-imposed restriction. It taunts us, more or 
less explicitly, with our ignorance. It tells us that we do ill 
to dogmatise on the attributes of matter when matter itself 
is all the while an unguessed riddle. Nay, do we not find 
ourselves half unconsciously trying to explain the origin of 
life, of irritability, and of consciousness ? 
But there are other gaps and crevices in our systematised 
knowledge which we cannot in any manner ignore. Dis- 
missing all enquiry as to origins and as to underlying 
noumena, we may adhere to phenomena, the impressions 
which we receive through our organs of sense. VVe may, 
as in faCt it is done in all research, postulate that these im- 
pressions, if not faithful transcripts of things per se, bear to 
them a constant and definite relation. This is a strong 
postulate. But letting that pass, we remark the very limited 
number of our avenues to knowledge. In common opinion 
vve have but five ; and even if we admit a heat-sense as dis- 
tinct from touch or the general apprehension of resistance 
and a magnetic sense, it is still unwarrantable to supposg 
