6oo 
Physiology and its Opponents. [October, 
thence to the slaughter-house and then put them to death 
with the pole-axe or the knife without giving them pain. 
We cannot deprive animals of their natural freedom, castrate 
the major portion of them (a decided piece of vivisedtion, as 
Mr. Robertson points out), and force them to work all their 
lives under penalty of the whip without giving them pain. 
If, therefore, we have the right to kill and to compel to work 
we have the right to give pain. And it is undeniable that 
the pain inflidtedin these two ways, could it be arithmetically 
summed up, would be found incomparably greater than that 
which has been and is being inflicted in all the physiological 
laboratories of the world. Those who believe the sensational 
historiettes about “ carving to death in cold blood should 
recoiled! that even putting fish into pure water, or into watei 
of any particular degree of hardness with the view of stuying 
the result is a “ painful experiment ” within the meaning o 
the infamous Vivisedtion Adt, and can in Britain be pel* 
formed only under license ! . . , „ „ 
Mr. Robertson enters upon an enquiry into Tights. ne 
says that the Bestiarian “ does not deny the right to put 
animals to service; and as a rule he concedes the light to 
kill for food. Now either of these cases will suffice to show 
that the * right ’ of man over animals is simply the assertion 
of his power. It is occasionally argued, indeed, that where 
man feeds and cares for an animal his right to its service is 
one of quid pro quo ; but it is only necessary to turn to the 
case of human slavery to find that ‘ right ’ in this connexion 
has no recognition in contemporary morals. No ethical 
authority now alleges that anyone has the right to keep 
another in slavery on the score that he gives him food and 
shelter.” . . “We attribute natural rights to those whom 
we conceive as having the same kind of affedtions and in- 
stindts as ourselves. . . But how, on this view, -does it stand 
with the claim of ‘ rights ’ for the lower animals ? If we 
recognised rights inhering in them as in the inferior (human) 
races, it is clear we should not even feel ourselves entitled to 
keep them in forced service, much less to kill them; whereas, 
in point of fadt, we do not even trouble ourselves to make 
sure that we have the ‘ right ’ to tame and work horses. 
The one check we ( i.e ., men of normal temperament) lecog- 
nise in the matter is in regard to over-working or ill-using 
them : there we have scruples ; but that only amounts to say- 
in 0- that at a certain point we so far conceive similarity betvveen 
us and the horse as to shrink from doing him serious injury. 
The ‘ right ’ to kill for food, again, can hardly be said to 
be’ seriously disputed, for even the extreme vegetarian would 
