26 
to me) in dealing with this subject in his article on the special 
creative hypothesis. (Principles of Biology , vol. i. p. 344.) In 
speaking of the parasites to which man is subjected, he asks, 
“ Shall we say that man, c the head and crown of things/ was 
provided as a habitat for these parasites ? or shall we say that 
these degraded (?) creatures, incapable of thought or enjoy- 
ment ( ? ), were created that they might cause unhappiness to 
man ? One or other of these alternatives must be chosen by 
those who contend that every kind of organism was separately 
devised by the Creator. Which do they prefer? With the 
conception of two antagonistic powers, which severally work good 
and evil in the world, the facts are congruous enough .” 
In the first place, I would remark that, of the two alternatives 
given above, the first is obviously absurd. It is axiomatic that 
man has higher functions and destinies than to supply food for 
parasites. Of the second, I would emphatically deny that, 
because parasites live on man, that therefore they were created 
to cause unhappiness ; not to notice the two questionable words 
he has used. Some, such as tcenia, may cause great distress ; but, 
of some others, we should be utterly unconscious until told of 
the fact of their existence upon our persons; and I suspect 
people, as a rule, are not aware of the presence of more than 
four or five, the majority causing little or no inconvenience at 
all. The purpose of causing unhappiness greatly fails of its 
end. The real question, however, is far wider than pure per- 
sonal inconvenience, even if it amount to an occasional death 
of the individual. It is this : Were all “ evils,” from un- 
pleasant things up to destruction of life, designed to cause 
unhappiness ? That is the question, to which I emphatically 
reply, “ Certainly not.” 
Again. The sentence which I have italicised is one which 
appears to me utterly absurd under any hypothesis whatever. 
Tor, if parasites be an “ evil ” work here spoken of, and man, 
presumably, the “good,” the argument cannot stop with man ; and 
we shall soon become utterly perplexed to know which animals 
are “ good ” and which are “ evil.” If those which prey on 
others, such as parasites on man, be (as is evidently intended 
by Mr. Spencer) evil, then, a fortiori, all carnivorous animals 
must be “ evil,” and we must presume all herbivorous “ good ” ; 
and man himself must therefore be “'evil” too. But we have 
seen that he was “ good,” and his parasites “ evil,” which is 
absurd. Cor . Of what character are those animals, such as 
the rat and pig, which partake of a mixed diet? 
The habitual use of this word “ evil ” has come down to us, 
I suspect, from the distortions of subjective philosophy; or, 
rather, subjective philosophy has merely expressed the idea of 
evil, which was hereditary from all antiquity, and inherent in 
