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separable from it, which he denies. True, he does not here use 
the word “ power,” in speaking of Force, but says “ that which 
produces : ” still he must mean power, because he does not 
believe matter or mind to be Force ; but these are they that 
produce motion, and as they are not force, he can only mean 
that they possess the power to produce motion, which power is 
named Force. This is confirmed by another sentence, in which 
he says, “ the term has a potential meaning, to depart from 
which would be to render language unintelligible.” 
5. Nevertheless, after having asserted that Force is a power, 
that it produces motion, is inseparable from matter, is an active * 
principle^ &c., he actually says that it is only an “ abstract or 
generalized expression.” These are wholly incompatible ; a 
generalization cannot produce motion, and is not only separable 
from matter, but has no relation to it, being the product of mind 
alone. To call force a mere useful generalization, is to deprive 
it of all potential meaning, “ and therefore to render his own 
language unintelligible ; ” he must consequently be understood 
as indicating by it “ an active principle inseparable from 
matter.” 
6. Many writers agree with Mr. Grove in his statement that 
force is a generalized expression; that antecedence and conse- 
quence are all that can be predicated of phenomena, we adding 
nothing to our knowledge by the affirmation of power, or by say- 
ing that these phenomena are produced by something. Not to 
dwell on the fact that all their reasonings about the persistence 
of force, &c., are wholly inconsistent with this hypothesis, we feel 
at once its discordance with the utterances of consciousness. 
We are conscious of power in ourselves, the power to originate 
our own volitions. -We cause, we produce, we call into existence 
that which but for our agency would not have existed. We are 
conscious that our volitions are not uncaused successive hap- 
penings in our mental history, but the immediate results of our 
own mental power. Power, therefore, is predicated of a 
conscious personal agent only. Hence it is that our first 
judgments of causation relate to ourselves originating our 
volitions. We are causes, our volitions are effects. All other 
effects produced by us are produced not immediately, as are 
our volitions, but mediately or instrumentally. Hence it is that 
our first judgment of secondary causation must refer to the 
relation between volition and some of its constituted sequents. 
Having gained the notion of power, in the consciousness of our 
self-personality, we then, in perfect accordance with a well- 
known law of thought, transfer this notion, first to our 
volitions, and ultimately to material realities. For example, 
before us is lying a quantity of gunpowder. Is not the con- 
