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and in a manner which admits of no doubt, that all our know- 
ledge is a knowledge of our states of consciousness. f Matter ' 
and f Force 3 are, so far as we can know, mere names for certain 
forms of consciousness Thus it is an indisputable truth 
that what we call the material world is only known to us under 
the forms of the ideal world ; and, as Descartes tells us, our 
knowledge of the soul is more intimate and certain than our 
knowledge of the body. If I say that impenetrability is a 
property of matter, all that I can really mean is that the 
consciousness I call extension, and the consciousness I call 
resistance, constantly accompany one another. Why and how 
they are thus related is a mystery. And if I say that thought 
is a property of matter, all that I can mean is that, actually or 
possibly, the consciousness of extension, and that of resistance 
accompany all other sorts of consciousness. But, as in the former 
case, why they are thus associated is an insoluble mystery.” 
13. The Professor, in the first place, here confuses knowledge 
and consciousness. As Mr. Moore expresses it, — “ When the 
conscious certainty which accompanies a given thought is 
determined by the constituted laws of intelligence, that thought 
is a knowledge.” We know matter, force, extension, and 
resistance as externals to self, but we are not conscious of them. 
We are conscious only of thoughts, feelings, and volitions. It 
does not follow that our knowledge of soul is more intimate 
than our knowledge of body, because we are conscious of self, 
but not of matter ; or because the material world is only known 
to us under the forms of the ideal world. Our knowledge of 
matter, with its powers and qualities, is as certain as our con- 
sciousness of self, because both are equally determined by the 
constituted laws of intelligence. I have as much right to deny 
the existence of self possessing the power of willing, as I have 
to deny the substantial existence of matter possessing the 
power called Force ; that is, I have no logical right to deny 
either. 
14. Professor Huxley's reasoning would land us in the purest 
idealism, absorbing matter, force, and even God himself; but a 
true philosophy of consciousness will save us from this most 
unscientific and undesirable result. 
15. There may be some excuse for all this haziness of thought 
if Mr. Spencer's supposition be true, — that force, as the 
“ ultimate of ultimates,'' is especially inscrutable. No doubt, 
force in its ultimate nature is inscrutable, but not more so than 
any other power in existence. The only explanation we can 
give is, that they are all the result of the will of an Almighty 
Creator. But Mr. Spencer, like Professor Huxley, seems to con- 
fuse the facts of consciousness with the affirmations of our neces- 
vol. vii. i 
