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that such blame may ever come, there is in man that which 
gives the keenest possible pain when wrong is remembered ; 
and in spite of even the greatest possible praise, this pain goes 
on increasing in the soul, in which the remembrance continues 
to show its power. There is nothing of this kind among all 
the facts which the naturalist gathers from the experience of 
the lower creation ; and yet this alone is the moral sense. 
We come now to the point at which it is necessary to remark 
that sensation is not thought. Sensation is feeling, and feeling 
is not thought. We may, no doubt, use the word feeling 
where we mean thinking ; but we never can do so when 
careful to express correctly the states of mind of which we are 
discoursing. It is not necessary to a sensation that any atten- 
tion should be directed even to itself, still less to the object by 
which it is produced. A little observation will satisfy any one 
that he may feel cold without directly thinking of his coldness, 
or of the air around by which he is chilled ; and especially he 
will observe that he may have that comfortable, though not 
always honourable feeling, which is called “ lukewarm ” without 
thinking of his sensations at all. So he may have all sorts of 
sensations without referring them to external objects. Sensa- 
tion is separable, and is often separated from thought. 
The confusion of popular thinking is illustrated on this 
point by Professor Huxley, who gives us very remarkable 
words on the point now in hand. In criticising an article in 
the Quarterly Review lately, and denouncing the idea that 
sensation is distinct from thought, he says, “ If I recall the 
impression made by a colour or an odour, and distinctly re- 
member blueness or muskiness, I may say with perfect pro- 
priety that I think of blue or musk ; and so long as the 
thought lasts, it is simply a faint reproduction of the state of 
consciousness to which I gave the name in question when it 
first became known to me as a sensation.” * Mr. Huxley 
apparently forgets that “ blueness ” and muskiness ” are 
abstract thoughts. No single sensation can give such 
thoughts. They are the result of the comparison of many 
sensations. They are possible only as such a result. They 
are no reproduction of a sensation or sensations, such as colour 
or odour produces, but the results of reasoning on a great 
variety of impressions. He could scarcely make a greater 
mistake, or one more fatal to his reputation as a careful 
thinker, than to confound such abstractions with simple sensa- 
tions produced for the first time in the soul. 
It would be every whit as rational to hold that a sight is a 
* The Contemporary Review , vol. xviii. pp. 459, 460. 
