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it may be that no two navigators could be found exactly to 
agree as to what that route is. Because one will take the 
worst route for the best one, and that in perfect sincerity, it 
does not follow that the worst is the best, or that a man may 
choose any one of them to equal advantage if he is only sincere 
in doing so. There is one way of acting which is in itself the 
right way, as certainly as there is one route between the two 
ports I have mentioned which is the best of all. 
Darwin seems to teach that the strongest impression is our 
only rule in morals. The idea is in keeping with his strangely 
defective notion of what a moral being really is, coupled with 
his equally defective notion as to the unchanging right. He 
says, “ A moral being is one who is capable of comparing his 
past and future actions or motives, and of approving or disap- 
proving of them.” Here he misses entirely that by which 
morality, or moral nature, has its significance. A thief, for in- 
stance, compares his past clumsy attempt to pick a pocket, on 
account of which he has got lodged in prison, with the much 
more dexterous practice by which he hopes to get the money 
and escape the next time ! He exceedingly disapproves of his 
past action, and as strongly approves of the future — is he 
therefore “ a moral being ” ? The right and wrong of his 
conduct escapes him as entirely as it does the dog which worries 
a sheep simply because of his impressions.” Moral nature 
in its essence is seen in neither of the cases, though in both 
Mr. Darwin* s definition might be realized. That thought of 
the unchanging right on which morality hinges seems to have 
dropt out of his remarkable mind. 
This is not the case because Mr. Darwin is unaware of the 
importance of the moral sense. He says, Of all the differ- 
ences between man and the lower animals the moral sense or 
conscience is by far the most important.”* In common with 
many others, he fails to distinguish between the feeling and 
the judgment ; but what is vastly more serious he fails to see 
the true nature of both. “ Acting for the public good ” is his 
highest idea of duty, and “ public opinion ” his highest view of 
the standard of that duty. The habit of acting according to 
public opinion is with him “ conscience.” He says, “ If, for 
instance, to take an extreme case, men were reared under pre- 
cisely the same conditions as hive-bees, there can hardly be a 
doubt that our unmarried females would, like the worker bees, 
think it a sacred duty to kill their brothers, and mothers would 
strive to kill their daughters, and no one would think of inter- 
fering. Nevertheless, the bee, or any other social animal, would, 
* Descent of Man, vol. i. ed. 1871, p. 70, 
