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case moves a limb in another case fails to do so. Volition is 
an act of mind, motor changes are effects in matter, and hence 
Mr. Spencer's explanation of Will is more illusory than even 
he imagines Freewill itself to be. He has a curious explana- 
tion as to how we distinguish between voluntary and in- 
voluntary movements. He says, “ The difference between an 
involuntary movement of the leg and a voluntary one is, that 
whereas the involuntary one takes place without any previous 
consciousness of the movement to be made, the voluntary one 
takes place only after it has been represented in conscious- 
ness ; and as the representation of it is nothing else than -a 
weak form of the psychical state accompanying the real move- 
ment, it is nothing else than a nascent excitation of all the 
nerves concerned which precedes their actual excitation."* 
What is a truly involuntary movement of the leg ? If the limb 
is moved by some one else than its possessor, we should say so 
far the movement is involuntary. If the limb is convulsively 
moved, whether the owner will or not, this also is involuntary. 
But it is neither of these Mr. Spencer contemplates. He has 
in view merely a case in which a man moves his limb without 
thinking of his doing so. There is the volition, only there is 
not the thought of it. Because there is no thought of it, 
Mr. Spencer concludes it is non-existent ! He supplies us 
himself with a perfect correction of his own mistake. In 
speaking of Berkeley, he says that that author confounds “ the 
having a sensation with the knowledge of having a sensation ." 
Again, “ while the reception of a sensation may be a simple 
undecomposable mental act, to observe the reception of a 
sensation is decidedly a composite one. The knowledge of a 
sensation so far from being an act of immediate consciousness, 
presupposes a much-involved process." He goes on to 
enlarge the same idea. Now, let us only put “ volition " for 
“ sensation," and it is clear that Mr. Spencer simply confounds 
the act of volition with the knowledge of our performing that 
act. Mr. Spencer abundantly refutes his own explanation. 
This author has a remarkable piece of logic which he gives 
as his strong reason for rejecting “the dogma of Freewill." 
He says, “ Psychical changes either conform to law or they do 
not. If they do not conform to law, this work, in common 
with all works on the subject, is sheer nonsense : no science of 
Psychology is possible. If they do conform to law, there 
cannot be any such thing as Freewill." What does Mr. 
Spencer mean here by “law"? We learn from another 
utterance. He says, “ Freewill, did it exist, would be entirely 
* Principles of Psychology , p. 614. 
