208 
at variance with that benevolent necessity displayed in the 
progressive evolutions of the correspondence between the 
organism and its environment.”* This clearly indicates that 
Mr. Spencers idea of “ law ” is simply that of “ necessity.” 
Only he says “ benevolent necessity ” ! What can he mean by 
the use of such an adjective ? Benevolent is really good- 
willing, and willing necessity , I confess, is to me a refractory 
phrase, whether the willing is good, bad, or indifferent. If I 
understand the word at all, necessity can be neither bene- 
volent nor malevolent ; it cannot be “ volent ” at all, any more 
than “ yes ” can be “no.” Moreover, it cannot be “ law,” 
for it admits of no “ breach,” nor does it admit of “ obedience.” 
“ Necessity has no law ” is an irresistibly evident proverb. No 
doubt, Mr. Spencer dreads the admission of that which would 
make his works “ sheer nonsense ; ” but the heavens might 
not fall even if that calamity should come. A good many 
authors, and their readers too, would still see sense in those 
works, which contend that volitions in very many cases do not 
conform to benevolent law. 
I, for one, am greatly easy as to the fate of necessitarian 
psychology when I venture to think that true law not only 
may, but must, involve free-will ; in other words, it must be 
a part of, at least, benevolent law that there should be true 
freedom. It surely may be one of the decrees, and as fixed 
and irrevocable a decree as any other, that within certain 
limits, a scope of action shall be provided for minds, so that 
they shall be truly free to conform to benevolent order, and 
so to act in breach of it. If a philosopher declines to see that 
this is the case in reality, and is no “ illusion,” it furnishes 
only another instance of human folly which will sometimes 
show itself even in the very “greatest.” Books must be very 
bare of sense if the admission of such an idea converts them 
into nonsense. 
There is a remarkable tendency to leave out by far the most 
important fact in an argument manifest in a certain class of 
minds. We have an illustration of this in the case of Professor 
Tyndall, when speaking of “ matter and force,” and one which 
is to the point in our present subject. Look at him performing 
an experiment before a meeting of working men, and you will 
see what I mean. He takes a drop of water, in which a crystal 
has been dissolved, and places it on a piece of perfectly clean 
glass. f Listen to what he says, and notice how completely 
he forgets himself. He is the only efficient cause in the case ; 
* Principles of Psychology , p. 620. t See Fragments of Science , p. 84. 
