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freedom of the soul of man in its volitions, and hence on one 
grand element of the ideas of right and wrong. 
It will be necessary now to show what is the other grand 
element of that idea. I have already indicated that utility 
is not rightness. A river flows for the general weal; a 
tree grows for the same ; even a hill raises its head, and 
catches the passing cloud for the same ; but no one will 
call these moralities. The acts of insane persons often 
produce great calamity, yet no one will call these immorali- 
ties ! Mathematics are as much moral philosophy as ethics, 
if we have no difference by which to mark them off but 
utility. It is consequently absurd to speak of an “ ethical 
standard” as found in the mere usefulness of action. 
There is a relation existing between minds and minds, and 
between minds and things, and in that relation an order , the 
declaration of which is perfect law. Free accordance with 
that laWj or, in other words, with that order , or, in still other 
words, with that relation , is moral right. Free discordance, 
moral wrong. This relation, order, law, forms the twin grand 
element, along with true freedom in the moral idea. It is the 
office of conscience to make sure of this accordance, and to 
mark it off from all discordance ; while it is the office of the 
moral sense to give force to the judgments of conscience. 
Let us look at the most important instance of what I mean. 
There is a relation between man and God. No amount of 
false thought can affect that relation. Even the most ardent 
denial given to the very idea of his being, leaves that relation 
untouched, as much so as does the most perfect faith. There 
is an order which arises out of tha/t relation which is as 
unchangeable as itself. No conceivable subjective state, or 
states, of the soul can modify that order in the least degree, 
any more than the fancy of an enthusiast can produce the 
perpetual motion. The relation makes a certain thing right 
and another wrong, — in other words, a certain thing in order 
and another out of order ; the law is simply the declaration of 
that which is in order, and of that which is out of order, or 
out of “ keeping,” as we say, with the relation. That man, 
who depends, as he does, on God, and is treated as he is by 
God, should supremely regard Him to whom he stands thus 
related, is pure reason when considered as thought in the soul, 
and true order, as it ever must be in reality, whether it is 
thought of or not. 
Ptelations similar (more or less) to this exist between man 
and man, and between man and all other creatures ; an order 
similar (more or less) arises out of these relations ; true law 
is just the declaration of that order. These relations are the 
