302 
when the occasion of the erection of a monument has been 
forgotten, a wholly legendary one has been invented. We are 
painfully aware that the presence of innumerable relics is no 
necessary voucher for the truth of the stories connected with them. 
The account given by Philo and Josephus of the mode in which 
the Septuagint version was effected is a most striking instance of 
the imperfection of oral tradition as an accurate reporter of facts 
after a considerable lapse of time. A period of 280 years had 
sufficed to encrust an historical fact with such a mass of fictions, 
that it is now impossible to disentangle the facts from the fictions. 
One might have expected that the position of the Alexandrian 
Jews would have been favourable to the transmission of the 
knowledge of the precise circumstances connected with the 
formation of this version. But the story, as handed down by 
Philo and Josephus, not only contradicts the phenomena of the 
version itself, but the facts of history as known from other 
sources, and, I think, is believed by no critic at the present day. 
What is more remarkable is, that a certain number of huts 
were shown at Alexandria as memorials of the fiction. 
III. I must now offer a few observations on that canon of 
historical criticism which summarily excludes all miraculous 
events from the region of history, and banishes them into that of 
mythology. To what extent is it valid ? How far does the occur- 
rence of miraculous events invalidate the whole context in which 
they occur ? This is a question with which the historical inquirer 
cannot help grappling. Stories of the kind are scattered over 
the whole period from the mythic ages to the recent alleged 
miraculous events in France. During some portions of time 
such alleged occurrences are very rare ; at others they abound. 
It will be unnecessary for me to examine the validity of the 
principle enunciated by Hume. This has been most successfully 
handled in a work recently published by a former member of 
this Institute.* I shall only offer a few observations connected 
with the general question, which are suggested by common 
sense. 
If all miraculous narratives are to be rejected simply on the 
ground that no testimony can establish them, because they form 
no portion of our previous experience, then it is evident that all 
extraordinary events, nay, that every event which has not been 
included in past experience, must share the same fate. It is 
impossible to lay down a line which shall accurately discrimi- 
nate between events which are extraordinary and those which 
are miraculous. I am ready to admit that certain miraculous 
events belong to an order which, with our present knowledge. 
* Warington , — Can I believe a Miracle f 
