340 
to appear as clothed in light, of so identifying themselves with 
the thunders and lightnings of Mount Sinai as to be undistin- 
guishable in the description, of ascending in the flame of the 
altar, of calling forth a burst of fire from a rock by the pointing 
of a staff, and as easily of spreading their wings on the blast and 
destroying the life of 180,000 men in one night. To roll with 
power the stone from the door of the sepulchre, or to smite 
Peter on the side with a gentle touch sufficient to wake the 
sleeper, evince alike their power over the material world— guided 
by perfect intelligence. 
54. But it will be objected that all these things are impossible 
and incredible, because they are contrary to the laws of nature. 
We have then to consider what this expression (the laws of 
nature) really means. 
55. In the charming and instructive book of the Duke of Argyll, 
the noble author enlightens us “ on the confusion of thought, 
arising very much out of the ambiguity of language/” He 
gives us five meanings in which the word law is habitually used 
in science, which are certainly four too many to form the basis 
of accurate reasoning. He also informs us, that of all the 
senses in which the word law is used, there is only one in 
which it is true that laws are immutable or invariable, and that 
is the sense in which law is used to designate an individual 
force . 
56. Let us, then, adhere to this simply rigid interpretation, and 
we are delivered from an almost infinity of plausible sophisms. 
A miracle, such, for instance, as iron being made to swim, is 
impossible no doubt, as contrary to the law of gravitation, 
otherwise it would not be a miracle. But, then, if we are 
compelled to believe in the existence of another and a spiritual 
world, having uncontrollable power to set aside the laws of this 
material creation, — also of an Almighty Being, having infinite 
dominion, — the question becomes simply one of testimony, not of 
science, and reads thus : Is there sufficient human testimony to 
lead us to believe that the order of this world, or what we call 
the laws of nature, has been interfered with and those laws set 
(in such instances) aside ? 
I have sought to show in Part I. (a) that the balance and 
weights Sire the special criterion by which to judge our theories 
regarding ponderable matter. In Part I. ( b ) I have endeavoured 
to prove that the abandonment of this test, and the denial of 
the real existence of matter, lead to mysticism. In Part II. 
I have argued that the more abstract idea of motion is still 
capable of being tested by the thermo-electric pile. In Part III. 
I have ventured on still more intangible ground, that of an 
ether scarcely capable of any test which can convey demonstra- 
