148 
one, and the subjects which I shall have to discuss or to advert 
to, are, to the Christian philosopher, most repulsive. 
The great subject of the year indeed, in the conflict between 
religion and science, is (I say it without disguise) atheism, — 
material atheism. Some are offended at the word, who do not 
reject the doctrine implied by it ; but, to coin a euphemism to 
veil or hide it, would be to exercise courtesy at the expense of 
truth. We have had the thing brought prominently forward 
before our eyes, and we need not dispute or wrangle about 
the word. 
God, in our sense of the word, is the personal and intelligent 
Ruler and Governor as well as the Creator of the world or 
cosmos, a being of infinite power, wisdom, and goodness, 
constantly superintending and providing for the welfare of His 
creatures. He is as present now presiding over every part 
of His creation, as He was, in the immeasurably remote ages, 
when He, by His will and infinite power, brought it into being ; 
and, by His Providence, He guides, adjusts, and pi’eserves all 
that He has made. The assumptions of this definition are all 
absolutely necessary for the idea of the Supreme God who is 
the object of our adoration; and nothing less will satisfy the 
requirements of religious faith, or the natural desires of the 
immortal soul. 
All the discussions, both ancient and modern, respecting 
the Supreme Intelligence seem to show that Natural Religion 
is unequal to the task of arriving at the correct knowledge of 
a Personal God, and it is only in proportion as we feel our 
helplessness in this particular that the blessings of Revelation 
will be fully felt and acknowledged. 
This definition will exclude the anima mundi , or Pantheistic 
idea of God, which confounds the Creator with His creation ; 
and also the Epicurean idea of a personal God, who did indeed 
create the universe at an infinite distance of time, but has left 
it to evolve itself without farther care or superintendence. 
I do not believe that the human mind can obtain a clear 
conception of either of these ideas of the Godhead, and I am 
sure that neither the one nor the other idea has been favoured 
by some of the greatest modern physical inquirers. 
As also the origin of sentient or animated beings will neces- 
sarily occupy some portion of this discourse, it is well to lay 
down some definitions with regard to it, or rather with regard 
to the origin of man. I shall assume that no theory is to be 
regarded as of any value which does not satisfy all the conditions 
of the problem with regard to man’s nature, that is, which 
does not afford some satisfactory explanation of his moral and 
