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the ground for Philosophy; but was no more to be rested in as 
an end than the extirpation of YirgiPs “horrida silva” of weeds 
and brambles is to be held for the completion of agricultural 
operations. Nor probably would Descartes have urged the 
application of his “ doubt ” to that higher class of propositions 
which we speak of as eternal truths. If, according to him, we 
cannot doubt of thought, so we may not venture to introduce 
our doubt where the object-matter is cognate with thought ; 
but be that as it may, the Cartesian dubitation was to be anterior 
to philosophy, and not an integral portion, still less the prin- 
cipal portion, of the system itself. 
Scepticism, however, as such, offers us little but doubt. It 
does not offer us a definite set of propositions to which we may 
assent, but, as we have seen, points out a set to which we must 
not assent. Now, as I have said of negation, so I say of doubt, 
that the mind cannot possibly rest in it. There is a longing for 
the credible, as there is for the affirmative ; and wherever assent 
is withheld without some definite assent, in another sense, being 
propounded, there the intellect is disappointed of its aim, and cut 
off’ from that fixed positive truth which it identifies with itself. 
This the earlier seekers after truth felt to their deep sorrow, 
when they missed of what they were seeking, though they felt 
sure it was to be found, and hoped even beyond hope of a Time 
and a Man who should bring it to them ; and the sceptics find 
it, too, when they turn away from the unchanging Truth to 
wayward doubt, and its chill, like the prison fetters of Joseph, 
enters into their very soul. They may call this freedom, but 
it is bondage ; they may exult in a pretended emancipation, but 
they are in the bondage of disquiet, the servitude of unrest. 
III. The Sorrow of Insufficiency . — I have said already that 
regret at a logical failure must not be considered as essential, 
but accidental, a supervening discomfort not connected with 
the logic itself. Yet I may without inconsistency append this 
to the two sorrows already discussed. They arise from the very 
essence of scepticism ; this, like the Aristotelian pleasure (for 
contraries correspond) is tTriyiyvoiuLvov tl ~i\og ry ivtpytly. 
It must, however, be very real at times. I mean by “ sorrow 
of insufficiency ” the regret that many, if not all, sceptics 
must feel at finding that, do what they will, they fail to clear 
away all the difficulties which attend the rejection of Revela- 
tion ; and scarcely, indeed, are able to deal with all the 
arguments alleged in its favour. It is not those who tell us 
loudly that the game of Christianity is played out, and that it 
must now take its place among the effete superstitions of 
humanity, not with the worst, perhaps, but still by no means 
