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what we have to do is simply to state the case fairly, to adduce arguments 
in favour of facts that are thus disputed, and to bring people’s minds to 
bear upon them in such a way that they may be convinced of their truth, 
and if so convinced, their convictions will be far stronger than those of 
people who are from the first ready to take everything on trust. There 
is one thing that we should be most careful about in conducting our 
arguments. Very often people arguing on these subjects do mischief by 
suggesting fresh doubts, while endeavouring to clear up others, and although, 
no doubt, those who have strong well-regulated minds may experience no 
difficulty in passing successively on from one stage to another— and there 
are, and have been, many philosophers who, in our own day, and in days 
that are past, began as sceptics, and by convincing themselves at each 
step that they had still farther to go, have ultimately risen from a youth 
of scepticism to an old age of belief, yet who can tell how many sceptics 
there have been who have died in their unbelief? There is nothing so 
dangerous as to sow doubts without knowing upon whose minds the seed 
may fall. We know that many a great author has, in his latter days, 
looked back with remorse when impressed with the idea that the tendency 
of his earlier writings has been to do much mischief ; and I am afraid that 
many of those who have suggested doubts, for the mere purpose perhaps 
of getting up an argument, or from curiosity to hear what may be said 
on the other side, and then have passed on and thought no more about 
it, may have done the same sort of mischief. (Hear, hear.) It is no excuse 
to say, “ I was then imperfectly informed, now I know better.” He ought 
to recollect in time, how very limited are our own intellects, and that 
things may soon appear quite clear which we formerly doubted, whilst 
on the other hand we may wonder at our believing others which appeared 
very clear to us a short time before. What can be more extraordinary or 
impossible of belief than many of those truths of natural history which are 
now known and believed by every man, woman, and child, who has 
received any education on the subject, but which scarcely any one in 
the last generation would have given credence to ? I think that one of 
the first points we ought to consider and inculcate is, how very humble the 
limited intellect of man ought to make him. (Hear, hear.) It seems to me 
that true humility is not more the attribute of an unquestioning childlike 
faith, than it is of the highest genius, and that the higher the genius, and 
the more profound the knowledge, the more humble is the mind and 
intellect of the truly wise man. (Hear, hear.) But, at the same time, 
we must recollect in all these arguments, that different minds are differently 
affected. We all know the old story of Charles V, who tried to make all 
the clocks in his palace go alike, and who, on finding that he could not 
succeed, said, “ How very foolish I must have been in trying to get all 
men to believe my own creed.” We ought, therefore, to be very tender 
in dealing even with those who put forward the most extraordinary notions 
or ideas that are most repugnant to our own. We must remember that 
