168 
that the object in moral matters is to act, not only to 
act rightly, but to act promptly, and to act earnestly, while 
the object in matters of Science is to know, and to know 
accurately, and for that purpose to reserve a decision for 
as long a time as may be necessary. The consequence 
is that for the purposes of the former province the habit 
to be acquired is that of forming a rapid and positive judg- 
ment upon mere probabilities— those being, by the nature 
of the case, the only materials for judgment accessible; and 
the men who _ have the greatest weight with their fellows 
m practical life, and who become their natural leaders 
are those who form such judgments the most boldly, and 
follow them with the least hesitation. But in the province 
ot Science the habit to be acquired is that of not forming 
decided judgments upon mere probabilities; but, on the con- 
trary, ol suspecting all appearances, and of demanding the 
most rigid demonstration before laying down a scientific truth 
as a sure basis for action. Our whole attitude towards reli- 
gious and moral controversies must, it would seem, depend 
on our recognizing at the outset the existence, as a matter of 
fact, of these distinct provinces of human life, together with 
the distinctness of the habits they respectively require, and 
determining to which of the two such controversies belong 
According as we relegate them to one or the other, we shall 
approach them with different mental and moral dispositions, 
and the “ Ethics ” we apply to them will proportionately vary. 
o. Now, m the article in question, this distinction has been 
fr°i I ?. U ^ 0v ’ ei 'l 0 °l ce d that the special meaning of the word 
belief” has been entirely left out of sight. It is a word of 
which the employment is somewhat vague in popular usage, 
but which will be generally recognized as possessing a fairly 
definite meaning for the purposes of such a discussion as the 
present. It is, at all events, very surprising to find that 
the distinction is not observed between belief and opinion 
scarcely even between belief and knowledge. “Belief” for 
instance, “that sacred faculty,” is described as beino- “rightlv 
used on truths which have been established by long experience 
and waiting toil, and which have stood in the fierce li -Bit of 
free and fearless questioning.” But what occasion is there 
for the exercise of this sacred faculty on truths of this kind v 
I hey are simple matters of knowledge, if knowledge can be 
predicated of any mental condition. It would be incorrect 
to speak of believing the law of gravitation ; we have a scien- 
tihc knowledge of it. Belief is properly applied only to truths 
which are neither evident of themselves, like mathematical 
