256 
and^W? materialistic Philosophers of the following century, 
“ the P-ent one, failed not tfo take th'e 
Leibnitz sought to find the right middle course. It is esne 
cially important to have a correct view of Leibnitz's opinions 
for Hartmann the father of the “ Philosophy of the Uncon 
scious, which is now under discussion in Germany says 
S 05 ' d f Un i* wussten > 1st ed., p. 14, 6th ed., p. 15) • “I 
confess » that it was the reading of Leibnitz which first 
led to the investigations here recorded." The point of denar 
ture with Leibnitz, as with Descartes and Spinoza, is the con- 
ception of substance. He defines substance as being which is 
capable of action. (This is the view of all genuine^Lalism 
« s Sy power 6 ”" It” “ So P hist > P- 247 - of being as 
j-' 1 1S wel1 also t0 remember iiow modem 
physics, m finding an expression for all concrete things in terms 
of motion, leads directly to the notion of force as omnipilsent 
* Jhe universe, which force a true philosophy can only conceive 
h explain, as having radically a spiritual origin, and in some 
way an ldea l nature.) No substance has parts ir ex ens ion 
Each is a simple centre of action. The number of substances 
indefinitely grctit. Each is called a monad. All monads are 
These g ktter ST* °i ther bj their different Eternal states, 
iliese latter are, m the lowest monads, elementary states of 
perception ana volition (or “ appetition ”), unaccompanied bv 
amZ°* y ti° r couscl ° usness • .'But, “there is an infinity of degrees 
other?” T 1 ? 6 d ? minatin 8 “ ore or lei over the 
S™, In tlle cent , ral and governing monad of a plant the 
internal processes and states, although ideal, are unconscious 
(UebSwee * h In S thn “ f ect , aa “ formative, vital forces” 
,-J. in the animal soul they are more distinct aurl 
toSTf r th m . emor y- This state is termed feeling 
[sentiment) lo the soul-monad of man is added the facultv of 
reason, w hich perceives the necessary connections of thought and 
truth ; whence man is said to possess a spirit. ° 
Leibnitz distinguishes between “perception • j.i 
internal state of the monad representfoTevter’. T th f 
apperception, which is the consciousness or reflected £!”*?’ 
of this internal state, and is neither^!™ m 111 k, owled ? e - 
all times to the sami soul.” ^"ti i^l^” ?f 
the most inferior monads are obscure and “ insensible ’’ Those 
of God, who may be termed the primitive and creative Mon?d 
contrary, all distinct and “adequate,” and extend 
to all things. Man, occupying an intermediate position 1™ 
ideas ranging all the way from complete obscurity, trough the 
