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contents of the universe than he or they are conscious of. But 
these facts (the wonderful instincts of man and animals ; un- 
erring accuracy and perfect adaptation of means to ends in the 
whole ordering of the forces of the universe, &c. &c.) by no 
means show that the agent to which they point is unconscious, 
or possesses anything less than the perfection of conscious mind. 
It should be remembered that Hartmann is so impressed by 
them that he ascribes all events and all things to the “One 
Unconscious,” utterly denying the reality of any subordinate 
agencies or forces. Thus, the soul of man is defined by him as 
“the sum of the activities of the One Unconscious which are 
directed upon one bodily organism.” All things are but mani- 
festations of the Unconscious. Now, I assert, and no remark- 
able degree of logical sagacity is required to pei'ceive the justice 
of the assertion, that it by no means follows that because the 
manifestation is unconscious, therefore the agent which mani- 
fests itself is unconscious. It is just as simple in point of theory, 
and far more reasonable, to suppose that it is by the everlasting 
“ I Am,” the personal God of religious faith, that “ the heavens 
drop down their dew,” that “ the inspiration of the Almighty 
giveth,” not only to men, but also to animals, and in the broad- 
est sense to all things, “understanding,” as to ascribe all the 
wonders of creation to an unreflecting abstraction. To do this 
latter is really but to reintroduce upon the scene, under another 
aspect, the irrational conception of blind force, which material- 
ists employ with such miraculous effect. 
As to the arguments intended to prove the conceivability of 
unconscious ideas, and hence of unconscious spirit or “ intelli- 
gence,” the two following are the principal ones. First, we 
know experimentally of no consciousness which is not associated 
•with a brain. Ergo, no consciousness is possible without a 
brain ( Ph . d. Unb., 6th ed., p. 391 : “Cerebral vibrations, or, 
more generally speaking, material motion, is the conditio sine 
qua non of consciousness”). The simplest answer to this is 
that which Ulrici ( Gott und der Mensch, 2nd ed., 1874, 1. Theil, 
p. 146) makes to the materialists, who regard the soul as a 
function of the body. If their arguments were correct, says 
Ulrici, then might we reason that “since nothing is visible 
without the presence of light or of a luminous body, therefore 
sight is only the function (effect) of light”! Because man’s 
present consciousness depends on a brain, it does not follow 
that it always will, or that all consciousness depends on the 
presence of such an instrument. And further, positively, the 
considerations which render it probable that the human mind 
uses the brain, and is hence distinct from it, go directly to 
